NATO approves plan to speed aid and training to Ukraine’s armed forces

BRUSSELS (AP) — NATO defense ministers on Friday approved a plan to provide reliable long-term security aid and military training for Ukraine after delays in Western deliveries of funds, arms and ammunition helped invading Russian forces to seize the initiative on the battlefield.

Kyiv’s Western backers have mostly concentrated their efforts through the Pentagon-run Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a forum for around 50 countries to drum up the weapons and ammunition the war-ravaged country needs most.

The new plan would be a complementary effort. Announcing the move after chairing a meeting of defense ministers in Brussels, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that the effort would be headquartered at a U.S. military base in Wiesbaden, Germany and involve almost 700 staff.

He said that it would help to organize training for Ukrainian military personnel in member countries of the alliance, coordinate and plan donations of the equipment that Kyiv needs, and manage the transfer and repair of that military materiel.

NATO chief continues push to let Ukraine hit Russian-based targets

The effort has been described as a way to “Trump proof” NATO backing for Ukraine, a reference to concern that former President Donald Trump might withdraw U.S. support for Kyiv should he return to office.

“It’s to make it proof to any situation,” Dutch Defense Minister Kajsa Ollongren told reporters on the sidelines of the meeting.

“We have to consider the fact that this (war) might go on for years. We want to have something in place that does not depend on specific persons, ministers, or whoever, but a structure that works,” she said.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who leads a stridently nationalist government, has routinely hindered NATO and European Union efforts to help Ukraine. He threatened to veto the plan but agreed to let other allies move ahead if Budapest wasn’t forced to take part.

A month ahead of Washington’s NATO summit, where are Ukraine’s jets?

Kyiv’s outgunned forces are battling to hold back a bigger Russian army. Troop numbers, ammunition and air defenses have run low as the Kremlin’s forces try to cripple the national power supply and punch through the front line in eastern parts of the country.

Moscow has taken advantage of a lengthy delay in U.S. military aid. EU funds were also held up by political infighting.

Ukraine will need to weather the onslaught through the summer, military analysts say, and at the same time train more soldiers, build fortifications and hope that Western military aid deliveries speed up so that Kyiv can mount a new offensive next year.

Stoltenberg has expressed hopes that U.S. President Joe Biden and his counterparts will agree at their July 9-11 summit in Washington to maintain the funding level for military support they have provided Ukraine since Russia launched its full-fledged invasion in February 2022.

He estimates this at around 40 billion euros ($43 billion) worth of equipment each year.

“We don’t yet have agreement on that,” he told reporters after Friday’s meeting.

German-Italian tank kerfuffle dings vision of Europeanized arms

ROME — The team-up between KNDS and Leonardo last December to build tanks and fighting vehicles was touted as a key step towards well timed European defense industry integration as the continent faces war on its border and growing competition from overseas.

“The aim is to create a truly European Defense Group,” the firms said at the time.

The spectacular collapse of the deal this week was a sharp reminder that business is business and deals will never get far if CEOs believe they will not make money.

Bolstered by a government-to-government accord between Rome and Berlin, the December pledge between Franco-German consortium KNDS and Italian defense giant Leonardo envisaged potential collaboration on a new Italian five billion euro program to build fighting vehicles and the possible entry of Italy into a KNDS plan for a new European tank.

It also laid the groundwork for what could have been a keystone in industrial integration: a stake for Leonardo in KNDS, which is consortium of Germany’s Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and France’s Nexter.

But in the short term the deal to kick things off was a major, €8.2 billion ($8.8 billion) acquisition by Italy of 270 Leopard 2A8 tanks, a program agreed hurriedly by Italy last year to honor NATO commitments as tank warfare grabbed headlines in Ukraine.

As they planned an assembly line for the tanks in Italy, Leonardo managers also saw chances to add their own electro-optical sensor, software defined radio, command and control system and possibly the gun barrel, only for manufacturer KNDS to baulk at the idea that a tank they had sold in a very standard format to 18 customers should be customized.

In a sharply worded press release on Tuesday, KNDS said it “is no longer in talks with Leonardo regarding a potential partnership with the Italian company.”

According to German and Italian analysts, political goodwill and strategic visions for European synergies could not stand in the way of balance sheets.

“If it was a case of electronics and additional drones, there could have been a way to plug in Italian systems, but a gun may have been considered too much,” said Christian Mölling, the deputy director of the German Council on Foreign Relations’ Research Institute.

“It may have created extra costs and risks that KNDS did not want. Their production is full so they didn’t need to compromise. Talks won’t change industrial reality which is driven by the wallet and not by political visions,” he said.

Alessandro Marrone, who heads the defense program at Rome think tank IAI, said Italy had lacked leverage with KNDS because the Leopard purchase was undertaken in a hurry.

“Thanks to a growing demand for Leopard in Europe KNDS is in a stronger position than before. Italy had to decide and plan the replacement of its main battle tank years ago, but after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the urgency to modernize Italian army’s heavy capabilities by replacing its obsolete Ariete tank reduced Rome’s leverage a partner,” he said.

The collapse of talks, he added, “tells us that it is difficult to find a solid agreement even where there are good reasons to do so and the chances of success are high. Defence cooperation and integration are the goals restated by European politicians over the last decade in many strategic documents, but the reality is more complicated.”

If Leonardo’s potential entry into KNDS as a stakeholder is now also less likely, Mölling said Italy’s participation in the KNDS-led Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) tank program could still go ahead.

“That is not off the table, firms can be competitors and partners,” he said.

Mölling said that in any case he still had doubts the MGCS program would get fully off the ground. “It may turn into an evolutionary program, a kind of laboratory to develop add-ons for the Leopard,” he said.

That however will not benefit Italy if it does not now buy the Leopard and instead opts for Rheinmetall’s prototype Panther.

Given that the Panther is still at the early stages of development, there may be room for the input of Italian systems if Rome signs up. But Mölling said cost would again be a factor.

“Can Rheinmetall match the 10-12 million euros cost of a Leopard?” he said.

Space Force picks three firms to compete for $5.6B in launch contracts

The Space Force chose Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin to compete alongside incumbents United Launch Alliance and SpaceX for launch missions worth up to $5.6 billion over the next five years.

The National Security Space Launch contracts, announced June 13, opens competition for the Space Force’s launch enterprise, which to date has been dominated by SpaceX and ULA, the only companies eligible to fly Defense Department missions.

Blue Origin’s entry into the market is due in part to the Space Force’s new strategy for space launch, which it calls NSSL Phase 3.

Under that approach, the Space Force created two lanes in which companies can compete — Lane 1 is for commercial-like missions and is geared toward new providers and Lane 2 is reserved for firms whose rockets meet more stringent security and performance requirements. The contracts announced June 13 are for Lane 1.

“Today marks the beginning of this innovative, dual-lane approach to launch service acquisition, whereby Lane 1 serves our commercial-like missions that can accept more risk and Lane 2 provides our traditional, full mission assurance for the most stressing heavy-lift launches of our most risk-averse missions,” Frank Calvelli, assistant secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, said in a statement.

Lane 1 will include at least 30 missions and, while the three firms are the only providers who can compete for the first round of contracts, newcomers can bid to join the pool after their rockets fly at least once.

Companies including Firefly Aerospace, Rocket Lab and Relativity Space are all developing launch vehicles with Lane 1 in mind.

Brig. Gen. Kirstin Panzenhagen, Space Systems Command’s program executive officer for assured access to space, said the service anticipates more providers will join the contract as their rockets qualify, noting that the next chance for those firms to on-ramp will come in the fall of 2025.

“As we anticipated, the pool of awardees is small this year because many companies are still maturing their launch capabilities,” she said in a statement. “Our strategy accounted for this by allowing on-ramp opportunities every year, and we expect increasing competition and diversity as new providers and systems complete development.”

As part of their selection for Lane 1, SpaceX and ULA each received $1.5 million for any risk-reduction and security measures needed to ensure their rockets meet the Space Force’s requirements. As a new entrant, Blue Origin received $5 million to cover an initial capabilities assessment.

The service also released two solicitations as part of Lane 1 — one to launch seven missions for the Space Development Agency and another for a National Reconnaissance Office launch.

Meanwhile, the Space Force expects to announce up to three Lane 2 companies this fall. Most of those 49 missions will go to two firms — likely SpaceX and ULA — but the service has the option to choose a third provider if a company presents a sound plan to certify its rocket for Lane 2 launches by 2026.

Eyes on Ukraine, demand for tanks is bubbling up in Eastern Europe

WARSAW, Poland — Drawing lessons from the ongoing war in Ukraine, several Eastern European allies are aiming to buy new tanks after years of neglect in this capability area.

German, South Korean and American producers are intensively competing for orders from the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, among others, amid a spike in demand for tracked platforms across the region.

Slovakia recently unveiled plans to buy new tanks, and local observers say the country wants to acquire up to 104 such vehicles. The potential purchase could radically increase the capacities of its land forces, which currently relies on about 30 outdated Soviet-designed T-72M1 tanks as well as second-hand, Germany-donated Leopard 2A4 tanks.

Germany gave 15 Leopard tanks to Slovakia following the transfer of its 30 BVP-1 infantry fighting vehicles to Ukraine.

“The Slovak Defence Ministry plans to acquire tanks — a main battle tank,” a spokesperson for the ministry told Defense News, noting that “an internal analysis of the market and possible methods of the acquisition is underway.”

The spokesperson said the ministry “does not currently have any offers, as it has not yet announced any selection process or public tender for the acquisition of tanks.”

The latest announcement comes as one of Slovakia’s neighbors, the Czech Republic, is advancing negotiations with Germany to carry out a joint acquisition of Leopard 2A8 tanks.

In December 2023, Czech Defence Minister Jana Černochová declared the government is seeking a more affordable price tag and quicker delivery time from KNDS, the Franco-German producer.

On June 12, Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala announced his government approved a plan to order up to 77 Leopard 2A8 tanks for the country’s armed forces.

“The Army of the Czech Republic could have a heavy brigade armed with more than 120 Leopard 2A4 and 2A8 tanks after 2030. The government has approved the intention of the Ministry of Defence to implement the purchase of 61 Leopard 2A8 tanks with an option for a further 16 tanks,” the prime minister’s office said in a statement.

“In addition, the Army already has 15 Leopard 2A4 tanks, the same amount will be received as a donation from Germany in the near future, and the Czech Republic intends to buy a further 15 under favorable conditions,” the office noted.

For Slovakia, joining the planned German-Czech purchase of Leopard 2A8s could provide potential benefits compared with an individual acquisition of tracked platforms. Local media reported that Slovak Defence Minister Robert Kaliňák has already discussed involving his country’s defense industry in manufacturing these tanks.

Meanwhile, Romania is gearing to acquire the M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams for its Land Forces after the U.S. State Department approved a potential foreign military sale of 54 such tanks, made by the American firm General Dynamics Land Systems, along with related combat recovery vehicles, assault breacher vehicles and other gear.

The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency said the planned procurement is worth about $2.53 billion. However, Romania-based observers expect its final value will be significantly lower.

In April 2022, Poland signed a deal worth about $4.75 billion to also buy the M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams with related equipment. It plans to acquire a total of 250 of these tanks.

In addition to the Abrams, Romania is also considering the purchase of South Korean-made K2 Black Panthers manufactured by Hyundai Rotem. Poland has also purchased this tank type.

Alexandru Georgescu, a Bucharest-based security and defense analyst, told Defense News it is likely Romania will decide to acquire South Korean tanks following recent trials of the vehicle.

“Romania has had a tendency — that is often criticized — to also spread its orders around instead of concentrating them for logistical purposes. Ultimately, it depends on the results of the requirements formulation of the Armed Forces and how the various actors meet them. We had recent exhibition trials in the Smârdan firing range near the city of Galați,” Georgescu said.

“The K2 Black Panther MBT [main battle tank] was tested on May 17. The tendency of Romania to follow in Poland’s footsteps as a form of coordination for improved synergies in logistics also speaks in favor of the K2,” the analyst added.

Poland has recently demonstrated a strong preference for American and South Korean tanks, leading Warsaw to purchase used M1A1 and new M1A2 Abrams as well as K2 Black Panthers. However, the swearing in of a new centrist government in December could pave the way for more European tank projects. In May 2024, OBRUM, a subsidiary of the Polish government-run defense giant PGZ, announced its readiness to join a European Defence Fund-backed program aimed at developing a new main battle tank for Europe.

Defense News has reached out with requests for comment regarding Eastern Europe expansion plans to General Dynamics Land Systems, the maker of the M1A2 Abrams, KNDS, which manufactures the Leopard 2A8, and Hyundai Rotem, the producer of the K2 Black Panther.

Marine training shifts may add tech, change officer assignments

Marine Corps changes to training and education in 2024 and in the coming years will establish more training teams, build a career path for instructors, add advanced technology and could alter how new officers are assigned jobs.

The Corps’ first Training and Education annual report on Force Design published Wednesday ― and the 14-page document noted moves made and laid out deadlines in areas across the service for modernizing how Marines learn.

Lt. Gen. Kevin Iiams, head of Training and Education Command, said in a press release that the document was the command’s “strategic vision” to implement education that matches modernization in Force Design and new equipment and technologies entering the ranks.

“These initiatives collectively aim to equip the Marine Corps with the most modern, lethal, and capable Marines conceivable,” Iiams said. “Our efforts have been, and will continue to be, centered on two core pillars: Force Design and modernization. By driving innovation along these vectors, (Training and Education Command) is ensuring the development of a Marine Corps force primed not only to compete but to dominate in any theater of operation.”

Marines say no more ‘death by PowerPoint’ as Corps overhauls education

The Training and Education 2030 planning document released in January 2023, under then-Commandant Gen. David Berger, laid out gaps in doctrine for such skills as drone and cyber operations, and emphasized modernizing training simulators and other education technologies.

Changes in training could have a direct, early impact on Marines in fires or communications jobs and new officers.

Training command has undertaken a two-phased study with combat development and integration to examine the “quality spread” policy used at The Basic School when assigning new officer military occupational specialties.

The quality spread is used to ensure that top finishers and lower-ranking graduates are spread evenly across the various job fields to avoid bunching up lower performers in one job field.

In its first phase, the study evaluated if evidence supports whether the policy should continue. Those results are expected by the end of June.

If it is found deficient, then the second phase of the study will build an alternate assignment model. That phase is scheduled to conclude before October.

Using a series of recent studies, the Marines plan to determine if measures testing an individual’s resiliency to help “screen out those who may be more susceptible to stress or adverse behaviors” to help lower attrition rates.

The Corps launched a pilot program in April at Marine Detachment Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to build a course for field artillery officers, target acquisition officers and field artillery scout observer chiefs.

The course aims to give those fires Marines in fires and effects coordination centers or fleet maritime operations centers advanced training.

The communication training battalion at Training Command is assessing how to combine critical skillsets from three communications job fields, 062X, 063X and 067X. That merging of those skills would make a more versatile communications Marine for multidisciplinary, “independent communications and information operators.”

As the Corps adopted its new training and education approach, it was evaluating how its instructors taught students and how the instructors themselves were selected and retained.

From that three-year evaluation has come an “outcomes-based learning” approach method. That method, while common in other education circles, has been less prevalent in military education. The approach puts more emphasis on having instructors guide students who learn both individually and in groups, completing tasks and problem-solving.

This is a break from the lecture model with an expert rattling off information at the front of a classroom for students to repeat on a test or quiz before moving to the next assignment.

The outcomes-based learning model will spread across the Corps, as the service has updated its formal school policy directives to include these methods.

“Instead of teaching them what to think, we’re teaching them how to think,” Col. Karl Arbogast, director of the policy and standards division at Training and Education Command, told Marine Corps Times in a previous interview.

But to teach this way requires training the instructors as well.

That’s resulted in two new exceptional military occupational specialty codes: 0951 and 0952. These are in addition to a Marine’s primary job but allow them to learn how to instruct.

The basic instructor course will be available to Marines by the end of fiscal year 2024 with the intermediate and master courses ready by fiscal year 2026, according to this week’s report.

Training Command is assessing both selection and retention of such qualified instructors, according to the report, and analyzing current and future incentive options to retain high-performing instructors.

On the technology side, the Corps has migrated its legacy information management system to a hybrid cloud system. The service expects to have a new, cloud-based version of the system fully operational by fiscal year 2028.

Tech moves are expanding war-gaming access through cloud services and expect to have war-gaming featured in all formal schools and primary military education by fiscal year 2025 and across the fleet by fiscal year 2026.

Also in the tech vein, the service will have deployed live, virtual, constructed training simulators to Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, Camp Pendleton, California and Marine Corps Bases Hawaii and Okinawa, Japan, before October.

At the same time, each Marine expeditionary force and the Marine air-ground task force training command will receive one battalion-capable Marine Corps Tactical Instrumentation System by summer.

The training command is preparing to field electromagnetic spectrum simulators at Twentynine Palms, California, that can replicate adversary electronic warfare capabilities in training.

The Marines plan to use simulators to cut down on injuries as well.

They have a project underway to identify ground training events that have a high rate of injury, mishap or casualty. They’ll then include simulator training prior to live execution of those types of training events, starting with the motor transport tasks before October.

Lastly, to cut down on Marines awaiting training for schools, the new policy will identify Marines prior to recruit training graduation who will wait longer than 10 days between Marine Combat Training and their follow-on school and assign them to the Permissive Recruiter Assistance Support Program.

Also, Marines in lengthy awaiting training periods will be offered a voluntary reclassification to a job that is experiencing shortfalls and an immediate school ship date.

A month ahead of Washington’s NATO summit, where are Ukraine’s jets?

BRUSSELS — At last year’s NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, 11 member countries pledged to train Ukrainian pilots to fly the F-16 fighter jet. It was a major decision, one that enabled the eventual choice to send the jets themselves, an upgrade to Ukraine’s air force that officials in Kyiv had wanted for more than a year.

But almost a year later, and only weeks before the next NATO summit, in Washington, those F-16s have yet to arrive. In fact, despite a commitment that those planes will start reaching Ukraine by the end of this summer, issues with their delivery are becoming clearer — from the number of pilots who will be able to fly them to crews ready to keep them working.

“The training pipeline on the F-16s is pretty meager,” said a senior U.S. defense official, speaking with reporters on the condition of anonymity to talk candidly.

F-16s hold the promise to firm up Ukraine’s self-defense. The fighters would bring its air force closer to NATO-style tactics and systems, making it easier to work with the alliance overall. And they could lengthen Ukraine’s range at a moment when other countries are dropping restrictions on what targets its military can choose.

“It gives them some options,” said CQ Brown, America’s top military officer, in a short interview this week.

And yet, it’s not sure how much of an option those fighters will be in the near-term. These are the two sides of delivering F-16s to Ukraine. One one hand, they could begin a long-term transformation of its airpower. But on the other, actually getting them there has proven frustratingly long-term as well.

“This is a huge undertaking,” said Jens Stoltenberg, secretary general of NATO.

The pipeline, the pilots

Stoltenberg spoke to a group of reporters near the doors of NATO’s headquarters in Brussels, shortly before a meeting of countries that gather each month to coordinate support for Kyiv.

Earlier in June, Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskyy met with America’s Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin in Singapore. And according to a post on Zelenskyy’s social media, the two discussed the group of countries supplying F-16s.

The Netherlands and Denmark are leading that effort, though other states like Norway and Belgium are also involved. The number of planes committed this year totals around 60, and Ukraine should start receiving those by the end of the summer.

That said, there have been multiple kinks in the process to deliver them, and make sure they’re useful.

The first is training. Between Europe and the U.S. there are only a dozen or so Ukrainian pilots learning to fly the planes right now, said the American defense official.

“That’s just a handful of pilots, and that’s just the pilots,” the official said.

Almost as crucial are the other members of the crew, such as maintainers, who keep the plane working. Brown made a similar point in the interview, saying that Ukraine will only be able to use as many planes as it has crews.

Training at Morris Air National Guard Base in Tucson, Arizona began last fall, and the first round of Ukrainian pilots graduated only weeks ago in late May. But finding spots for new ones has been difficult. There’s a small pool of Ukrainian pilots eligible for the training, which requires deep experience, and there’s already a queue of non-Ukrainian pilots in line as well.

A week before the meeting, Ukrainian officials told Politico that they had 30 or so pilots waiting for spots to start training but that none were available.

In a later press conference at NATO, Brown pushed back on the argument that European and American trainers are capped out.

“There is capacity,” he said.

The other issues are the length of the course itself — made more difficult by the highly technical English language training required — and finding a place to store them. Their usefulness will also depend on the stocks of munitions available to fire, which for other large weapons has been an issue throughout the war.

‘Wouldn’t want to rush it’

These issues aside, some analysts and defense officials are optimistic about what the jets could do for Ukraine’s force.

In a recent paper for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, U.S. military officers temporarily at the think tank argued that F-16s would threaten more Russian targets and help make Ukraine’s air force operate on standards similar to NATO’s — one of many goals as Kyiv pursues a spot in the alliance.

George Barros, who leads the Russia team at the Institute for the Study of War, told Defense News that the jets could be more useful considering the recent, if limited, policy change that allows Ukraine to fire across the border with Russia.

“We’ve written off the possibility of Ukrainians using air power in any meaningful way” to this point in the war, Barros said.

That could change, he argued, especially if the U.S. loosened its policy on striking into Russia even further.

In the interview on the way to Brussels, Brown was more cautious.

He, like other senior leaders in the Pentagon, urges people to think about how weapons and tactics work together rather than the effect of any one new piece of equipment.

“Just because they have the F-16s it’s not going to all of a sudden magically make things successful,” he said.

And that certainly won’t be the case, the other defense official argued, if the process moves faster than Ukraine can keep up with. Asked whether any planes would arrive by the Washington summit in July, the official said it would be better to wait if that meant they were more useful upon arrival.

“I wouldn’t want to rush it,” the official said.

Romania launches expansion of air base near Ukraine

CONSTANTA, Romania — The Romanian government has begun a multibillion-euro expansion and modernization project at one of its air bases near Ukraine, where new military equipment will be stored.

Romanian Defence Minister Angel Tîlvăr announced the move June 11 during a ceremony at the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base, located less than 200 kilometers (124 miles) from the Ukrainian border.

The project to extend the military base, which has housed U.S. capabilities and forces since 1999, was approved prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

“The reason why Romania decided to extend our capabilities here is the result of when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and later on in 2014 in Crimea [when Russia annexed the peninsula]. Our plans have been approved since 2018 for this,” Romanian Air Force Col. Nicolae Cretu, the base commander, told Defense News during the NATO-led exercise Ramstein Legacy held here.

The work will in part involve the construction of a new runway, a guard tower, and additional hangars to protect existing and forthcoming military assets purchased by the Eastern European country. The official estimated the cost associated with the expansion will come to €2.5 billion (U.S. $2.7 billion).

Romania has several ongoing acquisition programs, primarily focused on short-range and very-short-range air defense systems, on which it plans to spend up to $2.1 billion.

It also received two additional Patriot batteries last year, now totaling four, and is partaking in the joint procurement of up to 1,000 Patriot PAC-2 GEM-T missiles under the European Sky Shield Initiative.

The air base’s location has proved highly strategic in recent years, both for Romania and its NATO allies. As an example, the Romanian officer cited the base’s value during the Iraq war, as it was used by allies “to project force outside of their territories and over long distances.”

Romanian media reported the modernization effort involves the construction of a military installation similarly sized to that of Ramstein Air Base in Germany, although the official did not confirm this aspiration.

Given its direct access to the Black Sea and close proximity to Russian territory, the air base has hosted several NATO-run Enhanced Air Policing missions, including this year’s edition, which welcomed the first-ever deployment of Finnish F/A-18 Hornet fighter jets.

Defense spending bill would defund Biden’s Gaza pier

The House Appropriations Committee on Thursday advanced its fiscal 2025 defense spending bill while adding a provision that would eliminate the military’s makeshift pier off the coast of the Gaza Strip, which has struggled to deliver an adequate level of humanitarian aid to Palestinians facing famine-like conditions.

The committee voted 34-25 along party lines to send the $833 billion bill to the House floor with Democrats objecting to the provision that would shut down the pier, which will cost anywhere between $230 and $320 million according to Pentagon estimates.

The amendment from Rep. Andrew Clyde, R-Ga., bans the Defense Department from building or maintaining a pier or Joint-Logistics-Over-the-Shore capabilities “in the vicinity of Gaza.”

“The pier has been plagued by prolonged delays, hijacked humanitarian aid, additional costs and debilitating damages,” Clyde said ahead of the vote. “President [Joe] Biden’s Gaza pier has been a total failure. It’s not provided anywhere near the expected amount of aid to the Palestinians as promised by this administration.”

The Appropriations Committee adopted Clyde’s amendment by voice vote over objections from Democrats, who also opposed the final bill due to a series of socially conservative policy riders and a lack of Ukraine aid.

Rep. Betty McCollum of Minnesota, the top Democrat on the committee, noted that the Defense Department does not intend to continue its Gaza pier operation through FY25, which begins in October.

“A month ago, the head of the United Nations World Food Program announced that northern Gaza has entered a full-blown famine,” said McCollum. “This operation is only for a limited period of time and it ends in August when the weather and the seas will make it untenable to continue.”

Democrats on the Appropriations Committee also criticized a provision in the defense spending bill that bans funding for United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Another provision in the bill would prevent the president from withholding weapons deliveries to Israel and force the Pentagon to deliver the single shipment of roughly 3,500 air-to-ground munitions that Biden withheld in April.

Lawmakers on Wednesday also added two other amendments defunding the Gaza pier to the FY25 defense policy bill, separate legislation that the full House is expected to vote on Friday. The House adopted the provisions from Republican Reps. Nancy Mace of South Carolina and Warren Davidson of Ohio as part of a bipartisan package of amendments that both parties agreed to by voice vote.

The House on Wednesday added another amendment to the defense policy bill by voice vote that would bar the Defense Department from using funds to rebuild Gaza, though there’s no money allocated to do so in the defense spending bill. Lawmakers adopted the amendment from from Rep. Brian Mast, R-Fla., by voice vote over Democratic objections.

The House narrowly passed another Mast amendment 204-199 that would bar the Pentagon from evacuating Palestinian refugees to the United States, though the Defense Department has no plans to undertake such an operation.

Biden announced the pier to deliver aid to Gaza during his State of the Union address in March because of Israel’s ongoing restrictions on food, water, fuel and medicine deliveries through the land crossings. The pier sits on the coast at the end of the Israeli military’s Netzarim Corridor, which now divides the Gaza Strip in two.

Twenty aid agencies warned in May that deliveries from the pier have been inadequate to compensate for the low level of assistance through land crossings. And the UN World Food Program recently paused distribution of aid from the pier, citing safety concerns for its staff after rocket attacks on its warehouses.

Additionally, three U.S. troops sustained non-combat injuries in May while setting up the pier. Shortly thereafter, adverse weather conditions tore the pier apart and forced the military to repair it.

Are we sure China views sea power the same way the West does?

This is part of a series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. Click here to see the entire series.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy now includes multiple warship classes, fifth-generation fighters and an expanding submarine force. These means — combined with, in the words of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command leader Adm. Samuel Paparo, illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive maritime gray zone activities — seemingly imply that China’s strategic ends are self-evident.

However, on closer examination, strategists are right to ask if the U.S. — or more broadly the West — understands the extent to which China values sea power as an enabler for grand strategy. Are we mirroring or projecting our reasonable and rational expectations onto Beijing?

The problem with mirroring is that it catalyzes policies aimed at eliciting certain behaviors on the assumption that two actors think alike. Such mirroring can be the product of institutionalization or a lack of imagination, something that took Western naval analysts decades to discern during the Cold War. Even referring to China as the United States’ strategic “pacing challenge” implies an element of mirroring by benchmarking one against the other.

Consequently, policymakers should ask three questions to help frame our understanding of China’s view on sea power to formulate sound naval strategy and optimize resources for the future.

First, why isn’t China employing its naval force like we do? China is building aircraft carriers, but construction is not the same as operation. Ample evidence suggests China will employ its ships differently than the U.S. or U.K. navies.

For instance, Chinese carriers sail almost exclusively in the so-called near seas, rarely venturing beyond the first island chain, which stretches from Japan’s East China Sea islands through the Philippines. This is curious considering these waters are largely enveloped by the weapon zones of China’s neighbors.

Conversely, Western naval doctrine prioritizes safeguarding high-value assets, employing carriers in the open ocean to exert sea and air control over a wide area.

Moreover, whereas Western navies use carriers for power projection, China appears to use them to protect other naval forces. China has armed the capable Renhai-class cruiser with long-range anti-ship missiles that could make this ship, rather than a carrier, the centerpiece of a task force.

Some assess that China’s aircraft carrier program is a “propaganda showpiece.” Perhaps China’s naval buildup is about number parity or another instance of copycatting. Or maybe China believes carriers are a mark of superpower status.

Irrespective of the rationale, we fall into the trap of mirroring if we assume similar ships flying different ensigns will be employed similarly.

Why is China strengthening its military? It’s not all about war.

Second, why doesn’t China seek maritime partnerships like we do? The U.S. Navy values multilateral maritime partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region and strengthens them through exchanges, exercises, combined operations and industry cooperation. China has not pursued the same capacity-building approach.

Although China carries out periodic exercises in the Indian Ocean with Iranian and Russian warships, the commitment is lukewarm at best; in 2021, the Chinese didn’t show up. The interoperability practiced by the U.S. and its allies remains beyond the scope of Chinese naval ambition.

More recently, China has eschewed an opportunity for maritime multilateralism by declining to participate in Operation Prosperity Guardian in the Red Sea. This move underscores Beijing’s unilateral and skeptical approach, possibly out of fear of losing face in a congested maritime space or a belief that partnerships are liabilities rather than enablers.

By assuming that partnership-building is a cornerstone of all regional naval strategies, Western navies risk projecting allied diplomatic and military expectations onto China.

Third, why doesn’t China use its overseas naval facilities like we do? One of the key features of a global blue-water navy is a network of bases and port-access agreements in friendly countries. Western fleets use foreign ports to extend operational endurance and sustain forward presence.

While much has been written about the maritime elements of China’s Belt and Road Initiative — including construction projects in Djibouti and Pakistan — there is a difference between ports and bases; Long Beach is not San Diego.

China’s military facility in Djibouti is its sole overseas base but is only used regularly by China’s modest, three-ship Middle East task force. And while the hydrographics and piers can reportedly accommodate carriers, none have entered the Indian Ocean to date.

China has favored direct commercial investment rather than military facility construction. Consequently, it holds relatively little maritime influence in the Indian Ocean. Though Chinese warships refuel in Sri Lanka; repairs and rearming are conducted back home.

Mirroring happens when we expect China to use its overseas facilities as an extension of its naval might. These assumptions can then form the basis for U.S. policy decisions that allocate time and finite resources.

In fairness, it can be easy to commit the mirroring fallacy. To an untrained eye, China’s warships, aircraft, weapons and even uniforms look recognizably similar. And its tit-for-tat scorekeeping and documented belligerency makes it easy to assume the worst.

However, the truth may be that our views on sea power fundamentally differ. Look no further than China’s use of a “para-naval” militia to enforce maritime policies, a tactic anathema to Western conceptions of the rule of law at sea.

The scale and impact of China’s “opaque second navy” are monumental: Its Coast Guard alone forms the world’s largest of its kind, and its fishing fleet is the world’s largest.

Analysis must be clear-eyed given the stakes involved with two nuclear powers. Therefore, as the U.S. and its allies position their policies and platforms for the future, we would be wise to recognize if and when we may be mirroring our perceptions onto competitors. Only then can we appreciate that the beauty of sea power may be in the eyes of the beholder.

Cmdr. Douglas Robb commanded the U.S. Navy’s guided-missile destroyer Spruance, and is currently a U.S. Navy fellow at the University of Oxford. Lt. Cmdr. Andrew Ward is a warfare officer with the British Royal Navy, and is currently a Royal Navy Hudson fellow at Oxford. The opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Defense Department, the U.K. Defence Ministry, the U.S. Department of the Navy, nor the U.S. and U.K. governments.

This is part of a series exploring ways to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s fleet. Click here to see the entire series.

NATO chief continues push to let Ukraine hit Russian-based targets

BRUSSELS — NATO’s top official said he “welcomed” the choice by many countries in the alliance to let Ukraine fire across the border into Russia, arguing that the former restrictions in place ignored Ukraine’s right to protect itself.

“The right of self-defense includes also striking legitimate military targets on the territory of the aggressor: Russia,” said Jens Stoltenberg, the secretary general of NATO.

Stoltenberg spoke to a crowd of reporters near the entrance of the alliance’s headquarters in Brussels. Behind him, American and European officials entered ahead of a meeting of countries that gather each month to coordinate support for Kyiv.

In opening remarks shortly after, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin updated the list of numbers showing Russia’s costs incurred during the war: 350,000 casualties, 24 ships sunk or damaged, 2,600 armored vehicles destroyed.

This is the first such meeting since the U.S., following others in the alliance, loosened the rules on some of the weapons it’s sending Ukraine. To this point in the war, America hasn’t allowed Ukrainian forces to fire any munitions it’s provided into Russia, fearing escalation with a nuclear-armed adversary.

Russian advance on Kharkiv has ‘slowed a bit,’ US defense chief says

That policy changed in late May, when the administration made a carve-out for targets around Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city. Russia opened a new offensive around the city earlier that month, which forced Western countries to rethink their restrictions.

“The border and the front line is more or less the same” near Kharkiv, which sits close to Russia, Stoltenberg said. “If the Russian forces — the artillery, the missile batteries — were safe as soon as they were on the Russian side of the border, it would become extremely difficult for Ukrainians to defend themselves.”

Ukraine has since taken advantage of the policy change to hit Russian forces across the border — one of the reasons U.S. officials have said the front lines near Kharkiv have steadied.

Earlier this week, Ukraine’s General Staff reported hitting Russian air defense batteries in Crimea, a Ukrainian peninsula Russian forces seized in 2014. The range of the strikes would likely have required western weapons, such as the longer-range Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which can fire up to around 200 miles.

The U.S. still doesn’t allow Ukraine to fire these longer-range weapons into Russia. Ukrainian officials, including President Volodomyr Zelenskyy, have chafed at that restriction, saying they’re at once grateful for the policy shift but think it’s insufficient.

One of the reasons is a target still outside Ukraine’s reach. Russian bombers parked on airfields farther back have been pounding Ukrainian cities for the last year.

American officials have two concerns about lifting the remaining restrictions.

One is to make sure Ukraine makes the best use of the weapons provided, which involves concentrating the fires as much as possible. And another is the concern over escalation. Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal and has threatened their use multiple times during the war.

Stoltenberg, who publicly supported lifting the earlier restrictions before the U.S. did so, argued that the burden shouldn’t be on Ukraine or its allies to avoid escalation, given that Russia started this war to begin with.

“Ukraine has the right to strike military targets on Russian territory, part of the right to self defense, and we have the right to support them in defending themselves,” he said.

The question will grow more pressing later in the summer when Ukraine receives F-16 fighter jets, an effort the Netherlands and Denmark are leading as Ukrainian pilots complete training in the U.S.

On the flight to Brussels, Gen. CQ Brown, America’s top military officer, said in a short interview that those planes would lengthen Ukraine’s range of fire and support the country’s defense. He declined, though, to say whether they should be able to fire across the border, deferring the question to policymakers.

U.S. officials often urge the public not to focus on any one weapon or rule as a breakthrough during the war, and Brown too mentioned the broader set of equipment being provided as more important.

“It all comes together to give them just added capability to defend themselves,” he said.