Are the once-vaunted Bayraktar drones losing their shine in Ukraine?

BRNO, Czech Republic — The Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, which reportedly assisted Ukraine in military successes earlier in the war, are now of limited utility amid Russian forces bolstering their air defenses, according to a Ukrainian military official.

The assessment by Col. Volodymyr Valiukh, a commander in Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate, comes as unmanned aerial vehicles of all sizes and flavors continue to play a key role in Ukraine’s defense calculus. But new tactical constraints have come into play, he said.

In the early weeks of the Russian invasion, the drone often singled out in news headlines was the TB2, produced by Turkish manufacturer Baykar. Among the hits logged by Ukrainian TB2s are five tanks, six towed artillery pieces, six naval ships, two logistics trains, two multiple rocket launchers, two anti-aircraft guns and over a dozen surface-to-air missiles, according to the Dutch open-source intelligence website Oryx.

However, over the course of the last year, several reports noted that the drones seemed to have disappeared from available footage of battlefield action and that their use had become more limited in the face of more sophisticated Russian air defenses.

“For the TB2, I don’t want to use the word useless, but it is hard to find situations where to use them,” Valiukh said at the GSOF Symposium here on Oct. 26.

In an interview with Defense News, the Ukrainian commander clarified there is evidently still some use for them, but that the deployment frequency and roles for those drone types had changed.

“We are extremely grateful for the TB2s, but at the beginning of the war they were deployed more and striked more,” Valiukh said. Now that Russian air and electronic defenses have grown in quality, he added, the last TB2 flight he observed lasted a mere 30 minutes.

Per the manufacturer, Baykar, the drones can stay airborne for 27 hours.

The company told Defense News that reports about the limited utility of its flagship product should be taken with a grain of salt.

“Not seeing any videos does not necessarily mean that the drones are not being used,” CEO Haluk Bayraktar told Defense News. “This is a challenging environment to operate in,” with hundreds of medium- to long-range Russian air defenses deployed within range, he added.

“Currently, the Bayraktar TB2s are mainly used to conduct daily flights to track the targets, which can be as valuable as attacking,” Bayraktar said.

In that reconnaissance role, the usage rate in Ukraine is still high, according to company logs seen by Defense News.

“TB2s don’t attack unless they figure out open windows, no need to be an easy target for Russian air defense systems,” Bayraktar said. “This is the same for any other flying platform such as fighter jets, helicopters et cetera unless it is an affordable, low-cost mini drone,” he added.

Since June, Ukrainian TB2s have received upgrades that include advanced camera gear, the Mx-20, provided directly to the embattled country by Canadian manufacturer L3Harris Wescam. The new imaging equipment enables higher-altitude and longer-range surveillance missions, per the vendor.

US Navy submarine branch focuses on developing Project Overmatch

WASHINGTON — A reorganization of the Navy’s undersea warfare community two years ago has sharpened its focus on developing more modern warfighting tools, including a network of communications systems that will support joint all-domain operations, a top leader said.

The reorganization allowed the attack submarine and ballistic missile submarine communities to each look at new construction and sustainment of existing boats in one breath, versus treating them as separate endeavors. It also created a third program executive office, PEO Undersea Warfare Systems, to look at the networks, combat systems, weapons and more that would enable the submarine fleet.

The moves helped accelerate the undersea portion of the Navy’s Project Overmatch, according to Jay Stefany, the service’s acting assistant secretary for research, development and acquisition. Project Overmatch is the Navy’s contribution to the Pentagon’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control vision, which would provide multiple secure ways to communicate between ships, aircraft, unmanned systems and ground stations during military campaigns.

Still, the features developed under the initiative remain a work in progress. The first carrier strike group to deploy with Project Overmatch capabilities, the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group that deployed to the Pacific earlier this month, does not have this undersea capability, Stefany said. “But the next one will,” he told Defense News in an Oct. 23 interview.

“It’s in the works. It may not have been as much in works if we hadn’t consolidated” all the undersea support functions within a single PEO, he said. “So I think it’s exciting as we march our way down from a minimum viable product to a bigger, more full-up Project Overmatch.”

Stefany said the new PEO was collaborating with the PEO for Integrated Warfare Systems, which manages surface ship combat systems, to participate in efforts to achieve “more modern software delivery, automated testing and ultimately over-the-air software updates” to surface ships and submarines.

The new office has also created a stronger “production mindset” for the Mk 48 and Mk 54 torpedo programs, which Stefany said had gotten off track.

The organizational changes two years ago also have ushered in a greater awareness of the need to synchronize submarine construction and maintenance plans, he said.

Submarine maintenance and modernization had previously been managed under a different flag officer than submarine construction in both the attack-submarine and the ballistic missile-submarine communities. The reorganization allows the latter faction to work the delicate transition of sustaining existing Ohio-class boats until the new Columbia-class boats come online, something Stefany said is going well today.

Stefany said the reorganization provides the attack submarine community a chance to reform submarine sustainment efforts, which have suffered in recent years from lack of parts and delays at repair yards. Even as leaders still work through these issues, Stefany said there’s more work to do to bring a new mentality to sustainment work.

The Navy is executing its Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program to overhaul and modernize the public yards. Once the facilities themselves are improved, Stefany said the Navy would look to overhaul the process by which submarine work is scheduled, planned and executed at the yards, to make it more akin to a contract at a private yard that includes cost and schedule incentives.

NATO eyes ‘quantum-resistant’ encryption in 5G drill

MILAN — NATO member countries have set their sights on securing military 5G communication networks against hacking by adversaries possessing powerful quantum computers.

Alliance officials hosted an exercise to that effect earlier this month at a test site in Latvia. The event, dubbed 2023 Next-Generation Communication Network Technologies, was organized by NATO’s Allied Command Transformation and the Latvian defense ministry to present systems capable of enabling multi-domain operations. The term refers to the seamless coordination of land, air, naval, space and cyberspace assets in military campaigns.

One of the focus areas was for demonstrators to showcase approaches to improve command-and control-capabilities with the use of virtual reality, secure post-quantum encryption and apply sensor fusion for situation awareness, according to a press release provided by the organizers.

Scientists have warned for some time of the threat posed by quantum computers to crack common encryption algorithms that protect military hardware and intelligence operations.

The sense of urgency has ushered in the term “quantum-resistant encryption” to describe next-level security mechanics.

Last September, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) released the future quantum-resistant algorithm requirements for national security systems. Considering ongoing pursuits in quantum computing by international actors, the report called on industry “to now plan, prepare and budget for a transition.”

NATO governments also have begun testing post-quantum solutions. In 2022, the NATO Cyber Security Centre, responsible for the everyday protection of the alliance networks, successfully tested safe transmission flows using a virtual private network (VPN) supplied by the British firm Post-Quantum.

A VPN can utilize different algorithms provided by the manufacturer to ensure secure communications by guaranteeing that only the appropriate recipient of the data can read it.

Another method allies have experimented with is quantum key distribution, which consists of exchanging encryption keys, only known between the shared parties, that can be used to encrypt or decrypt further communications.

According to a NATO report on the subject, one of the distinct properties of this method is that it allows “only for the intended recipient to decode the message transmitted, making any eavesdropping impossible.”

In 2022, through this approach, a NATO Science for Peace & Security (SPS) project aimed to connect Malta and Italy for the first time with a prototype secure quantum communications undersea link featuring submarine, fiberoptic cables.

While quantum computing technology remains in its infancy, the importance for military organizations and the defense industry to get started now is to discover flaws in algorithms before they spread, thereby preventing widespread vulnerabilities in the future.

Businesses reposition amid growing demand for solid rocket motors

WASHINGTON — After L3Harris Technologies acquired one of the two U.S.-based solid rocket motor providers in July, the new division’s chief embarked on a barnstorming tour of the sector.

For nearly two months, Ross Niebergall bounced from one newly acquired Aerojet Rocketdyne facility to another, he told Defense News, spending just two days in his home office as he reviewed propulsion production processes for critical weapons such as the Javelin, Stinger and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System. One of his goals: finding ways to open up the military’s constricted pipeline for rocket motors.

With the $4.7 billion purchase, L3Harris made itself a key player in the lucrative world of missiles, munitions, hypersonic technologies and other weapons. It’s a rapidly expanding sector — one that will most certainly keep growing amid global turmoil, from Israel to Ukraine to the Pacific region, said analyst Roman Schweizer with the Cowen Washington Research Group.

Experts say the increasing demand but limited supply for the roughly $60 billion global rocket and missile propulsion market could continue to drive further acquisitions, partnerships and expansions. And some researchers believe that market could be worth $85 billion to $93 billion by the end of this decade.

Such deals could lead to new investments in the field, potentially expanding the pipeline for critical parts and systems and boosting supply.

Indeed, other companies in the rocket propulsion industry are making their own moves, reshuffling the market with potentially wide-ranging effects.

Smaller defense technology firm Anduril Industries, for instance, in June acquired solid rocket manufacturer Adranos, which specializes in a high-performance solid rocket fuel it calls ALITEC. The deal gives Anduril its first foothold in the missile market.

Additionally, X-Bow Systems, a small aerospace firm in Albuquerque, New Mexico, founded in 2016, surprised competitors in the solid rocket motor industry when it received in September a $64 million contract from the Pentagon for Army and Navy hypersonic boost propulsion systems. X-Bow, pronounced “crossbow,” became the first new company in decades to supply solid rocket motors to the Defense Department.

And Lockheed Martin — whose bid for Aerojet Rocketdyne was stymied by federal regulators last year — is in late-stage negotiations to partner with an unidentified rocket propulsion supplier, though details on that partnership remain scarce.

Over the last decade, the Pentagon’s annual budget requests for missiles and munitions procurement as well as related research and development have more than tripled, from $9 billion in fiscal 2015 to $30.6 billion in fiscal 2024. And it’s unlikely lawmakers will stop pressuring the Pentagon to catch up with China and Russia on developing hypersonic weapons.

This could mean continued jockeying as companies seek to position themselves.

“There’s a stronger demand signal than there is supply, and some people see an opportunity to build into these markets,” said Byron Callan, a defense industry analyst and managing partner at the research firm Capital Alpha Partners. “You see a need, you’re going to fulfill it.”

L3Harris makes its play

In a September interview at L3Harris’ Washington office, Niebergall said the company in early 2022 reviewed which defense markets it had a hand in — and where it was essentially on the sidelines.

One area that jumped out was the missiles and rocket industry, a multibillion-dollar market “that we weren’t effectively participating in a significant way,” he said.

When Lockheed Martin backed off its attempted acquisition of Aerojet Rocketdyne following a Federal Trade Commission lawsuit, L3Harris saw an opening to make itself a major supplier in the growing rocket engine and propulsion business.

L3Harris envisioned Aerojet as mainly acting as a supplier on major programs, not a prime contractor. That strategy would allow L3Harris “to be on as many teams as possible” for missiles and rocket programs.

Now, L3Harris is trying to determine how to apply its expertise and resources to the Aerojet business. As Niebergall toured Aerojet facilities and as L3Harris combed through the workflow processes for flagship programs — including propulsion systems for the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, the Army Tactical Missile System, the Standard Missile series and the Patriot air defense system — the company found chokepoints a tier lower in the supply chain.

For example, Niebergall said, with some weapon programs’ designs dating back to the 1970s, often only a single, small manufacturer is qualified to make a particular kind of steel motor case or component Aerojet needs. This hinders the company’s ability to surge production on such systems if necessary.

And in some cases, Niebergall said, Aerojet didn’t have full visibility into the programs on which it served as a subcontractor and was “held at arm’s length from understanding the full mission.” Without that full picture, Aerojet was unable to suggest ways to refine or improve customers’ requirements, he added.

But now L3Harris can “bridge that gap and bridge that understanding,” Niebergall said.

“My focus is going to be working to help create the health of that entire supply chain so that we can ramp up our delivery for what we anticipate are increased demands,” he explained.

This story will likely continue to play out in the market, said Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute think tank. As companies’ work on missiles, space rockets and hypersonic tech takes up a greater share of the market, he explained, firms will want to insulate themselves from supply disruptions caused by labor disputes or a lack of parts.

“Rocket fuel in particular is one where there’s a very limited industrial base,” Clark told Defense News. “So having another path of supply is going to be really important. Because energetics, there’s only a couple of companies that make them, and they’re somewhat dependent upon a unified supply chain when it comes to the underlying chemical materials.”

Indeed, the solid rocket motor-industrial base in the U.S. has gone through multiple changes in recent decades, according to a 2017 report by the Government Accountability Office. Since 1995, GAO said, the industry consolidated from six U.S. manufacturers to two — Aerojet Rocketdyne and Orbital ATK.

For its part, Lockheed Martin wants additional solid rocket motor suppliers to augment its pipeline and strengthen the supply chain, chief executive Jim Taiclet said during an Oct. 17 earnings call.

“Our objective is to bring anti-fragility into our own supply chain first, and to broadly apply that to the DoD,” he said.

The first step, Taiclet explained, is to find another rocket motor supplier for the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System — a role now filled by both Northrop Grumman and Aerojet Rocketdyne — and then expand this approach to other programs.

“We want to augment our existing supplier and have a dual source, frankly,” Taiclet said. “That will extend into other systems, large and small and legacy and advanced.”

Lockheed is still in partnership negotiations with an unidentified company, Taiclet noted, but more could be on the way.

That company might be Nammo, a rocket motor firm based in Norway that also operates in the U.S., Callan said in a newsletter to investors.

“This is not a one-shot deal,” he added. “It’s going to be a long journey, and we’ll probably have additional participants and programs as the years and even decades roll on.”

In 2024, L3Harris’ first full year after the Aerojet acquisition, Niebergall said the parent firm will focus on modernizing the subsidiary’s rocket propulsion manufacturing in Camden, Arkansas; Huntsville, Alabama; and Orange County, Virginia, under a nearly $216 million Pentagon contract Aerojet received in April under the Defense Production Act. This is intended to accelerate the production and delivery of Javelin, Stinger and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System weapons for Ukraine.

Over decades of production, those weapons have been hampered by inconsistent stop-start patterns of orders and deliveries. Because Ukrainian forces use those three systems so heavily in its fight against Russia’s invasion, the U.S. Army and the Pentagon anticipate a long-term need and want to be able to rapidly scale up production.

“Aerojet Rocketdyne in and of [itself] is a 5,200-person company,” Niebergall said. “Now we’re bringing the resources of a 52,000-person company to manage that as a program.”

Once L3Harris and Aerojet make production of those weapons more consistent and prolific, Niebergall added, the parent company plans to use those upgrades as a blueprint for the rest of its programs and systems. That will include applying digital tools commonly used at L3Harris to increase automation of legacy Aerojet weapons, he said.

Alan Chvotkin, a government contracting expert and partner at Washington law firm Centre Law Group, said the Aerojet acquisition “propels L3Harris into a much higher level tier among defense suppliers” and could continue driving its growth.

And if L3Harris can help Aerojet produce more propulsion systems — and faster — the Pentagon and prime defense firms would have more options from which to choose, Callan said.

L3Harris has not ruled out its potential to serve as prime contractor on some weapons programs. Last year, for example, it was one of three companies vying to create a new stand-in attack weapon for the F-35 fighter jet. Northrop Grumman ultimately won that contract.

“We will certainly look at opportunities [to bid as a prime contractor] where it makes sense, based on our capabilities,” Niebergall said.

Anduril jumps in

Six-year-old Anduril has typically focused on emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and autonomous drones. But its acquisition of Adranos — the company did not disclose its value — gives Anduril a toehold in the hypersonic technology and missile market.

Chris Brose, Anduril’s chief strategy officer, said the war in Ukraine has highlighted how critical it is to expand this market.

“We don’t have enough weapons. We don’t have enough rocket motors to put on the back of the weapons that we’re going to need to have,” Brose said. “That pie needs to grow, and we want to help win a share of the growing pie.”

He said a driving force behind that problem is a lack of capacity in the solid rocket motor-industrial base, in which Aerojet Rocketdyne and Orbital ATK — acquired by Northrop in 2018 — do the lion’s share of the work. There’s enough growth potential that a smaller company can compete and broaden the industrial capacity for rocket and missile production in the process, he argued.

Solid rocket motors are used to propel everything from air-launched missiles to heavy-lift rockets that launch satellites into space. They burn a solid propellant consisting of a fuel and oxidizer mixture, which is encased in a cylinder, ignited and exhausted through a nozzle.

“Even if the government were pouring money into both of those companies, we’re still going to need more capacity to generate the weapons required to be relevant in an INDOPACOM scenario,” Brose said, referring to the potential for conflict in the Indo-Pacific region involving the U.S. military.

“The government needs Aerojet Rocketdyne. The government needs Northrop Grumman-Orbital ATK. But we also need new capacity, new entrants who can really get to scale and provide rocket motors to produce larger quantities of weapons,” Brose added.

In the last year or so, Anduril began seriously looking for a way to enter this market. Executives considered Adranos “far and away” the best positioned for an acquisition, given its potential production capacity in Mississippi, the technological advancements of its production methods, and its high-performance, high-range ALITEC propellant.

Brose said ALITEC could be useful for multiple weapons, particularly the RTX-made Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile. And Anduril sees opportunities to provide rocket motors for everything from anti-tank munitions to advanced hypersonic weapons. Brose said Anduril is in discussions with prime contractors on such programs.

Anduril’s acquisition of Adranos brought with it the smaller company’s 450-acre production facility in Mississippi, set up to produce these systems. The parent firm is now looking to modernize and further develop that facility to bolster production capacity, Brose said, and allow for the production of more standard solid rocket motors in addition to more motors that use ALITEC fuel.

A new entrant

X-Bow Systems, a small company of about 100 employees, originally focused on commercial small launches when it was founded in 2016, chief executive Jason Hundley told Defense News. Its plan was to buy solid rocket motors from major suppliers, he said, but the company quickly found that was unaffordable.

“If we were going to be serious about this launch technology based on solid rocket motors, to do this economically, we were going to have to take this problem on ourselves,” Hundley said. “Because we didn’t know of any other suppliers out there.”

X-Bow took a different approach and now specializes in three areas: launch services, energetics technology, and designing and building an array of solid rocket motors.

But as the firm broadened its reach, it saw the U.S. military’s scope also widening to encompass hypersonic programs. Also in play was the Air Force’s next-generation nuclear missile, dubbed Sentinel. These two areas were receiving significant investments, with the Sentinel procurement alone likely to cost at least $85 billion.

The company began to try to crack the military propulsion market, and its move paid off in September with a $64 million contract, making it a large solid rocket motor provider for the Pentagon — the military’s third.

Under this contract, X-Bow’s solid rocket motors will power the Navy’s hypersonic all-up round for its Conventional Prompt Strike weapon system as well as the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon System.

X-Bow in February opened a new facility at a decommissioned airport in Luling, Texas, south of Austin, to build solid rocket motors and hypersonic technology. The firm plans to spend $25 million developing the facility over the next two years. In a release earlier this year, the company said it had already finished building a hangar and several solid rocket motor test pads there.

Hundley said X-Bow’s smaller footprint at locations such as its Texas facility will allow it to focus on affordability as it creates propulsion systems for the Army and Navy.

‘Massive demand’

Even as these companies expand, demand continues to grow. The Ukrainian military has rained down scores of artillery shells and rockets on Russian targets on a virtually daily basis, while Israel has launched airstrikes at the militant group Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Both Ukraine and Israel receive supplies from the United States. And to fill those battlefield needs — plus stock U.S. forces and other foreign customers — continued government and market investment in this sector is almost guaranteed, according to Schweizer, the defense analyst with Cowen Washington Research Group.

“There’s massive demand for rocket motors,” Schweizer said. “And when there’s an oversized market opportunity, companies will go after that. That’s where the money’s at.”

But with relatively few companies providing such technology, he noted, over time the industry may see new entrants reach the upper end of the high-performance rocket market.

“There’s also some concerns within DoD about having such a constrained industrial base and supply chain, so it’s a function of expanding that as well,” Schweizer said.

Anduril and other companies “look at the billions of dollars that are going to be spent on refilling U.S. weapons inventories, increasing stockpiles, the fact that there are hundreds of rocket-propelled munitions being shot every day,” he added. “There is significant demand for at least a decade or more.

“It’s just, sadly, a good business to be in right now, given the state of affairs in the world.”

A victory in Ukraine will require a maneuver division

There are some who are criticizing Ukraine for taking so long to win, and others who are questioning whether they can win at all. The conflict appears to be mired in a stalemate — a battle of attrition along the lines of World War I that’s heavy on fires but low on maneuver. Given that many Ukrainians have been trained by NATO allies, why is this the case?

One answer is that we have not provided the Ukrainians with enough equipment to maneuver.

In order to fight this war, Ukraine must be able to shoot, move and communicate. Despite shortages in munitions, NATO has been providing Ukraine with the ability to shoot, even if evermore shells and rockets are needed given expenditure rates. Starlink has provided Ukraine with the ability to communicate. What’s missing is sufficient quantity of protected mobility, also known as combined arms maneuver.

The U.S. Army has such formations: armored divisions consisting of three to four maneuver brigades of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, an artillery brigade, a support brigade for logistics, and another brigade of other enablers such as engineers, signal and air defense.

Producing and fielding this amount of equipment for Ukraine would take many years — time that the Ukrainians are paying for with the blood of their soldiers and civilians. And even if Congress appropriates the funding requested by the president, industrial base issues mean that it still wouldn’t get there in time. The solution then is to transfer this equipment from the U.S. Army today and then purchase new equipment for the Army over the next several years.

In more specific terms, the Army should transfer a division’s worth of equipment to Ukraine. This would not only assist Ukraine in breaking through Russian defensive lines, but it would also help modernize the U.S. Army, build industrial depth and increase the Army’s readiness in the near term by ensuring 100% manning in the service’s existing units.

A division’s worth of equipment isn’t some arbitrary number. It’s directly linked to the current size of the Army, which is struggling to maintain structure due to it being in the midst of one of its worst recruiting crises. The lack of soldiers in Army units is so bad that the service has to rightfully cut the structure of its special operations forces. But those cuts are just the beginning, as the Army’s active duty end strength has fallen by about 7% over the past few years, dropping from around 485,000 personnel in fiscal 2020 to around 452,000 today.

Transferring this equipment would help modernize the Army. Many of its weapons are decades old and must eventually be replaced with more modern versions of the Abrams tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle as well as the new Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle. Because of the existing budget pressures on the Army, it wouldn’t be able to afford this needed modernization of equipment on its own. By transferring weapons and gear to Ukraine, the Army would receive more modern weapons in return.

Next, transferring this equipment would provide industrial depth, reinforcing a lesson that the Army and the rest of the services must learn from Ukraine: We may be unable to rearm ourselves during war. Sending these weapons as well as countless others through the steady drip of the Pentagon’s aid packages have forced the Army to rapidly increase its own ability to produce the tools of war.

Take, for instance, 155mm artillery shells. Without the war in Ukraine, there would have been little impetus for the Army to ramp up shell production from 14,000 shells per month within the last year to 28,000 shells per month today and to 57,000 shells per month by next spring — and even beyond that, to 100,000 artillery shells per month by 2025.

That’s an astounding increase, and transferring even more equipment to Ukraine would reinforce this lesson among Army leaders to expand production of other needed equipment.

Finally, the Army must cut the number of its units, or else it will become hollow — a phrase that came to being at the end of the 1970s and denotes an army that exists in name only. Possessing too much structure and not enough soldiers is the quickest way in which one gets to a hollow army. Therefore, divesting of a division’s worth of equipment today makes the Army more ready. When and if recruiting recovers, the new replacement equipment will begin to arrive.

In short, for the sake of the future of the Army and the future success of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, the Army should transfer a division’s worth of weapons and equipment to Ukraine. It would be a small price to pay in the long run to help the Ukrainians defeat one of our top adversaries and modernize the Army in the process.

Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. John Ferrari is a senior nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute think tank. Ferrari previously served as a director of program analysis and evaluation for the Army.

‘Hacktivists’ join the front lines in Israel-Hamas war

WASHINGTON and JERUSALEM — When Hamas sprung its deadly assault on Israel in early October, its militants came from land, air and sea.

The Palestinian group launched rockets at populous areas, deployed drones to destroy observation posts, used motorized gliders to float fighters over fortified borders and dispatched speedboats into defended waters. The effects were instantly tangible, with many Israelis killed, abducted or displaced. Infrastructure, including hardened military installations, was damaged.

Less apparent were the virtual campaigns waged before, during and after the opening salvos, though not necessarily by Hamas itself. Hackers supporting its cause hijacked billboards and flooded phones with threatening texts. Grisly videos quickly circulated online, and social media platforms such as X, formerly Twitter, were saturated with front-line footage, some of it fake.

The online efforts serve many purposes, experts told C4ISRNET, including influencing public opinion, softening resistance and hampering the emergency response.

Upgrade networks or suffer on the battlefield, generals warn

Cyberattacks “are increasing daily, with hundreds of attacks we’ve monitored so far,” said Gil Messing, the chief of staff at Check Point Software Technologies, a cybersecurity company with roots in Tel Aviv. “Our data shows an 18% increase in attacks on Israeli targets since the beginning of the war, and we expect it to continue.”

Hack-tivity

Outside groups with vested interests in the Israel-Hamas fight are dominating the cyber battlefield.

Operations include defacing popular websites and flooding networks with artificial traffic, rendering them unable to function. This tactic is known as a distributed denial-of-service, or DDoS, attack. Similar moves were seen in the opening days of the Russia-Ukraine war.

“Cyberattacks happened all along, before the [Hamas attack] and after,” said Messing, whose team monitors dozens of third-party groups around the world.

“Hacktivists play a critical role here and actually carry out the vast majority of attacks,” Messing added, using a term for hackers motivated by political or social movements.

Cloudflare, an American company that provides cybersecurity and network services, said media sites were prime targets in the wake of the Oct. 7 Hamas incursion. For example, the Jerusalem Post was knocked out Oct. 9. The outlet boasts millions of monthly visitors and bills itself as the No. 1 English-language website covering Israel.

Other targets included the computer software industry, financial sectors and government services.

“Before Oct. 7, there were barely any HTTP DDoS attack requests towards Israeli websites using Cloudflare,” the company said in a blog post. “However, on the day of the Hamas attack, the percentage of DDoS attack traffic increased. Nearly 1 out of every 100 requests towards Israeli websites using Cloudflare were part of an HTTP DDoS attack. That figure quadrupled on Oct. 8.”

Such attacks are relatively unsophisticated and have little consequence on national security operations, experts said. While a vandalized website can disconcert the public, it likely does not sidetrack military operations.

As a result, pinning the importance of the cyber domain in the Israel-Hamas fight has thus far proved tricky, according to Annie Fixler, the director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

“It is a moving target because we’ve seen a lot of activity, we’ve seen ramp-ups of activity. Deciphering the level of significance of that activity, I would say, is an ongoing challenge,” she told C4ISRNET. “There are a lot of hacktivist groups that are going to claim to have had an operational impact, when what they really did was DDoS a website or deface a website.”

Offense and defense

Israel is regarded as well-versed in cyber warfare, wielding capabilities that rival the virtual arsenals of much larger powers. Officials years ago recognized cyber as an emerging field that could lend the country — stuck in a “bad neighborhood,” as Israeli officials and outside analysts describe it — a distinct advantage.

Elite divisions have since cropped up, such as the Israel Defense Forces’ Unit 8200, which specializes in intelligence gathering and cyberspace operations. The unit has been likened to the U.S. National Security Agency or the U.K. Government Communications Headquarters.

No, Rafael’s ‘Iron Beam’ laser didn’t blow up missiles over Israel

“Generally speaking, Israeli offensive cyber capabilities are sort of second to the United States,” Fixler said. “Our general sense is that the Israelis have the capabilities they need. There is not a significant capability that we could provide to them that they do not already have themselves.”

The U.S. in October said it was rushing cyber support to Israel but declined to provide specifics. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency is coordinating with the Israel National Cyber Directorate, according to Brandon Wales, the executive director at CISA.

Furthermore, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin is said to have held daily calls with his Israeli counterpart, Yoav Gallant.

Kate Fazzini, a cybersecurity professor at Georgetown University, described Israel as a leader in the cyber domain, one capable of digitally outgunning Hamas.

“They are far more sophisticated than their population size,” she said. “I would say the sophistication is certainly on par with the United States.”

A report published by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank in 2021 and updated this year put the U.S. atop the cyber-power hierarchy. China, Russia and Israel were among those placed one rung below, in a second tier.

A separate report posted by the Washington-based Atlantic Council think tank described Hamas’ cyber capabilities as nascent and “lacking the sophisticated tools of other hacking groups,” but not to be underestimated.

The road ahead

Amid the Israel-Hamas war, officials are watching for signs of regional aggravation or wider escalation. Experts interviewed by C4ISRNET said they have their eyes on Iran, Russia and the Lebanon-based militant group Hezbollah.

Wanton cyber activity could intensify the already bloody battle, with reports of thousands killed.

“The one way that cyber would make a huge difference is if it bleeds into the kinetic landscape — if either side is able to turn off water, able to make any kind of changes to the electric grid,” Fazzini said. “Is a larger power capable, like Iran, of waging a cyberattack in Gaza to make Israel look worse? I think that’s also a possibility.”

Iran in 2020 was linked to a cyberattack that aimed to disrupt water supplies in Israel. The attack was detected and defeated, and the water authority later hired a cybersecurity firm to beef up its defenses, the Times of Israel reported.

“If you have that cyber-to-kinetic connection,” Fazzini said, “I think that’s the main issue.”

U.S. cyber specialists spent three months in Albania this year, attempting to expose hacking tools in the wake of Iranian cyberattacks on government systems. The attacks on the smaller NATO ally forced key services offline, including the Total Information Management System, which tracks details of those entering and exiting the country.

Both Messing, of Check Point Software Technologies, and Refael Franco, the former deputy chief of the Israel National Cyber Directorate, said Iranian-aligned cyber groups pose a real threat to Israel. Franco took it a step further, saying the groups “are still working against Israeli critical infrastructure and vital assets.”

Besieging critical infrastructure, such as the communications, energy, health care, and food and agriculture sectors, could inflict widespread damage.

“Israel must be ready to operate ‘Plan B,’ ” Franco said, and execute an “ASAP response if there is a cyberattack.”

Boeing’s P-8 plane had unfair advantage in Canada tender, firms allege

VICTORIA, British Columbia — Boeing had an unfair advantage over other companies in Canada’s competition for new surveillance aircraft, executives at two major firms alleged.

Éric Martel, president of Bombardier, and Joel Houde, vice president of General Dynamics Mission Systems’ international division, wrote in a letter to Canadian Public Services and Procurement Minister Jean-Yves Duclos that the proposed replacement of the Royal Canadian Air Force’s CP-140 Aurora aircraft was biased in favor of the P-8.

The U.S. State Department on June 27 approved a foreign military sale to Canada for 16 P-8A aircraft and related equipment at an estimated cost of $5.9 billion.

But in the Oct. 23 letter to Duclos, seen by Defense News, both Martel and Houde said their companies, along with 22 other firms, responded in good faith to a 2022 request for information from the Canadian government.

The RFI asked for industry input on a new surveillance plane as part of the Canadian Multi-Mission Aircraft project. The aircraft would need to be fully operational by 2040, according to the Canadian government’s request.

Bombardier of Dorval, Quebec, as well as General Dynamics Mission Systems-Canada of Ottawa, Ontario, proposed a Global 6500 special-mission aircraft.

But in their letter to Duclos, the two executives noted government procurement officials on Oct. 17 told lawmakers the request had the “hallmarks of deliberate activity to orchestrate a particular outcome.”

“Worse, their testimony also revealed that requirements were withheld from Canadian industry, thus providing an advantage to an American company and seemingly resulting in a biased outcome,” the letter added, citing testimony before a House of Commons defense panel.

Procurement officials acknowledged to the panel they never sought input from Canadian firms or examined aircraft other than the P-8.

“It is inexplicable how Canadian government officials can conclude there is no Canadian solution [to meet aircraft requirements] when they have not had a single aerospace expert meet with Canadian industry to review the detailed engineering behind Canadian industry alternatives,” Martel and Houde wrote.

Duclos’ office didn’t respond to the specific issues raised in the letter but noted a final decision on a new surveillance aircraft has not yet been made. That decision “will be based on the capability offered, availability, pricing and benefits to Canadian industry,” according to a statement from the minister’s office.

Boeing, which declined to comment, has conducted a public relations campaign to support the proposed P-8 deal, noting it has more than 550 Canadian suppliers across Canada, with 81 directly contributing to the P-8 program.

Political intervention

The Canadian military originally planned to launch a competition in 2024 to replace the Royal Canadian Air Force’s CP-140 Aurora fleet. The deadline to submit bids was set for 2027.

Apart from Boeing’s P-8 and Bombardier’s Global 6500, Japanese firm Kawasaki pitched its P-1 aircraft.

But in a surprise move in March, Canada requested pricing from the U.S. government for a fleet of P-8 Poseidons. Public Services and Procurement Canada, the federal contracting department, announced at the time that the P-8 was the only aircraft able to meet Canada’s needs.

That sparked a lobbying campaign by Bombardier and its industry partners, prompting the premiers of the country’s two largest provinces to call for an open competition that would allow Canadian vendors to bid.

Quebec Premier François Legault and Ontario Premier Doug Ford issued a joint statement July 12 calling on Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to allow Canadian firms to compete to provide the Royal Canadian Air Force with a new maritime patrol aircraft.

“These domestic firms should be able to compete in open, transparent tenders for important Canadian procurements, such as Canada’s Multi-Mission Aircraft replacement,” the premiers noted. They also called on Trudeau and other ministers in the ruling Liberal government “to stand up for the Ontario and Quebec aerospace and defence sectors and allow our firms to compete in an open CMMA tender.”

Ontario has the largest economy in Canada, followed by Quebec. The latter is the largest of Canada’s 10 provinces in area and is second only to Ontario in population.

“It’s an important contract, and we can understand the U.S. government must put a lot of pressure on the Canadian government. But we have a Canadian company, Bombardier, having plants in Ontario and Quebec that can supply what is needed,” Legault told reporters July 10 in Winnipeg, where he was meeting with other premiers.

Industry sources anticipate the Canadian government will to review and approve the purchase of the P-8 in November. However, government officials have not provided details on the final decision or an announcement’s timeline.

Leonardo, Elbit units to prototype targeting device for US Army

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army selected two companies to develop prototypes of a next-generation laser targeting system that troops can carry and use in the field to scout locations and coordinate strikes.

Both Leonardo DRS, the Virginia-based subsidiary of Italy’s Leonardo SpA, and Elbit Systems of America, a unit of Israel’s Elbit Systems Ltd., will work on the Joint Effects Targeting System II project, or JETS II, according to contract announcements.

Neither company disclosed the value of the preliminary agreements, which will run for more than two years. An original JETS manufacturing contract awarded in 2016 was worth almost $340 million.

The JETS setup resembles a pair of futuristic, heavy-duty binoculars. It features high-end sensors, such as a rangefinder, thermal imager and celestial compass, and can connect to other digital systems to pass along information. JETS II is expected to be compatible with coordinate-seeking, laser-guided and conventional munitions.

New in 2018: Army to field new fires targeting system

Both Jerry Hathaway, a senior vice president and general manager at Leonardo DRS, and Erik Fox, Elbit America’s vice president of warfighter systems, said in statements the forthcoming tech is based on real-world feedback.

“We are proud to have built on the success of our JETS I technology to provide the most comprehensive hand-held target location system available today,” said Hathaway. “Leonardo DRS is known for its leading position in advanced sensors and sensor systems, and we are excited to continue this relationship with the U.S. Army over the next several years.”

The service published a request for prototype proposals for JETS II in late 2022. As many as 25 prototypes were thought necessary for testing, documents show.

Jordan asks US to deploy Patriot air defense systems

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates — Jordan has asked the United States to deploy Patriot air defense systems on its soil, according to Jordanian Army spokesman Brig. Gen. Mustafa Hiyari.

“This system is an expensive system, and there’s no way to provide it with local resources,” he told state media Oct. 29. “We need a strategic partner.”

“There are potential ballistic missile threats against Jordan,” he added, without specifying them.

Jordan does not host American bases, Hiyari said, but the U.S. does have a presence in the country to train Jordanian forces and provide upgrades and maintenance to equipment. In January 2021, the countries signed a defense cooperation agreement, which gives the U.S. “unimpeded access” to certain Jordanian facilities.

Also on Sunday, the General Command of the Jordanian Armed Forces dismissed allegations that U.S. aircraft were using local air bases to supply Israel with equipment and ammunition for use in the Israel-Hamas war.

The military alleged the aim of such allegations is to undermine Jordan’s steadfast support of Palestine and to tarnish the reputation of its armed forces. It said Jordanian field hospitals are attending to the casualties from attacks on in the Gaza Strip and the Royal Jordanian Air Force remains committed to delivering humanitarian and relief aid to Palestinians.

The Jordanian government called for an end to violence in Gaza and warned of dangerous repercussions. It has also condemned Israel’s treatment of the Palestinian people and emphasized Jordan’s role in protecting the Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem.

What are the takeaways from Ukraine’s fight in the Black Sea?

Ukraine has shown surprising naval capability in the Black Sea, helping to protect its shores and shipping while keeping its predator’s fleet at bay. This achievement is remarkable because Ukraine is virtually bereft of warships. It has succeeded through the skillful use of emerging technologies, such as explosive-laden uncrewed surface vessels, and of older ones, such as land-based missiles and naval mines.

The current war is the latest in a long history of battles in the Black Sea, a crossroads whose fertile shores have induced numerous nations to seek to dominate the sea and its approaches. Thucydides described Greek fleets fighting there over 2,400 years ago; more recently, Turkish and Russian fleets fought intermittently for centuries.

Some of these battles have taken place in the same areas as today’s fighting. In the Crimean War of the 1850s, British and French warships contributed to the siege to Russia’s naval base at Sevastopol. Others have focused on the Turkish straits, the Black Sea’s only exit. During World War I, Britain, France and Russia tried and failed to seize those straits.

In World War II, the Soviet Union’s Black Sea Fleet fought the naval forces of Nazi Germany and its allies near Ukraine’s shores. During the Cold War, the Soviets saw their fleet as vital to protecting against NATO warships that could attack its southern flank.

A key constraint on naval power in the Black Sea has been the limited ability of non-littoral nations to get their warships through the Turkish straits. Since 1936, the Montreux Convention has restricted the number and size of warships that they can operate within the Black Sea, as well as how long they can stay there. The convention also gives Turkey the right to close its straits to warships in time of war or when it perceives a threat. Turkey has exercised that right in the current war, preventing Russia from reinforcing its Black Sea Fleet, while also limiting access to the sea by other NATO nations.

On the other hand, Russia and other littoral states are subject to no such constraints when they build up fleets within the Black Sea. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, its Black Sea Fleet had 300 or more warships and submarines, vastly more than any other littoral country. Although the fleet was divided among Russia, Ukraine and Georgia, Russia is now the sole heir. It destroyed the Georgian fleet during its 2008 invasion.

During its 2014 seizure of Crimea, Russia used a millennium-old tactic — scuttling old vessels in a key channel — to trap Ukrainian ships in port, then seize them from the landward side. The result has been that the Russian Navy has dominated the Black Sea for the last decade.

In its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has sought to use naval power in the Black Sea as an integral element. It has launched missiles against land targets, menaced Ukraine’s coastline with a potential amphibious invasion and sought to throttle Ukraine’s vital maritime trade. This strategy has had limited effectiveness because of Ukraine’s skillful use of uncrewed surface vessels, missiles and naval mines.

Ukraine has repeatedly employed explosive-laden USVs to target ships, even in Russian ports hundreds of miles from Ukrainian-controlled waters. Ukraine also likely used them to damage the Kerch Strait Bridge, a vital logistical link between southern Russia and occupied Crimea. Ukraine is now developing an explosive-laden uncrewed undersea vehicle, which can achieve greater stealth than a USV.

Last year, Ukraine’s anti-ship missiles sank Russia’s Black Sea flagship, the Moskva. Recently, Ukraine’s land-attack missiles damaged Russia’s fleet headquarters in Sevastopol and an advanced S-400 air defense system. Some Russian warships are fleeing occupied Crimea for ports further east, though even those may remain within range of USV attacks.

Throughout the conflict, naval mines have hindered Russia’s ability to launch an amphibious assault against the key port of Odesa and other coastal areas. Ukraine’s ability to nullify Russian sea power has facilitated grain and other commercial shipping along the western edge of the Black Sea.

Ukraine has shown that a combination of USVs, land-based missiles and naval mines can deny a superior navy the ability to exercise sea control, at least in a relatively confined body of water. Ukraine has achieved this, in part, by pioneering the use of low-profile, explosive-laden USVs (these have ancient antecedents, such as fireships).

Other technologies are not new: Anti-ship missiles have been used for over 50 years, and even nonstate actors like Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthis have employed them (with Iranian assistance). Mines have stymied superior navies since the Crimean War of the 1850s. Ukraine’s contribution is to demonstrate how the deft use of these technologies in combination can offset a stronger navy’s advantages.

The lessons from today’s fighting in the Black Sea may not be universal. In more open waters, some aspects of Ukraine’s innovative approaches may be negated. Open-ocean environments could enable warships to operate at safer distances from land-based missiles, small uncrewed surface vessels’ bases and waters conducive to mining. However, throughout history, most naval battles have been fought in relatively confined coastal waters.

Moreover, uncrewed surface vessel and uncrewed underwater vessel technologies will continue to mature and be employed for an ever-wider range of missions. Today’s struggles in the Black Sea may herald a changing face of naval warfare, in which large warships are increasingly vulnerable even to nations that lack substantial navies.

Scott Savitz is a senior engineer at the think tank Rand, where former U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow.