Archive: December 29, 2022

Lockheed doubles Joint Air-to-Ground missile range in flight test

WASHINGTON — Lockheed Martin has developed a new version of the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile that doubles its current range, and the American company told Defense News it proved the capability in a recent flight test.

The new missile, which Lockheed is calling the JAGM-Medium Range, or JAGM-MR, traveled 16 kilometers (9.94 miles) in a flight test on Nov. 16 at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, California.

The company also incorporated a tri-mode seeker that pairs a low-cost imaging sensor with the seeker’s semi-active laser and millimeter wave sensors. The U.S. Army originally required the JAGM weapon to have a tri-mode seeker, but the service walked back to a dual-mode seeker requirement during a competitive development stage.

Cost was a factor for the Army when choosing to back of the tri-mode seeker requirement, but since then the price of tri-mode seeker technology has become more affordable.

The Army and the Marine Corps declared JAGM ready for full-rate production at the end of August 2022. The decision was delayed after the weapon previously failed to achieve desired lethal effects on a maritime target, resulting in the Army and the Marine Corps delaying the missile’s fielding by more than a year.

JAGM will replace Lockheed-made Hellfire missiles aboard American aircraft and will first be fielded on AH-64E Apache attack helicopters and Marine Corps AH-1Z Viper helicopters.

The longer-range capability is critical for the military’s desire to achieve greater standoff from enemy locations — to operate out of range of enemy weapons systems — Joey Drake, program management director of air-to-ground missile systems at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control, told Defense News in a recent interview.

The Army has repeatedly stated its need for longer-range munitions across the board, but particularly for its helicopter fleet. It is also pursuing a long-range precision munition in a separate competitive effort and is currently using Israeli company Rafael Advanced Defense Systems’ Spike Non-Line-of-Sight missiles in the interim.

Along with the improved seeker, “there’s been quite a bit of activity and interest in this new capability with customers international and domestic,” Drake said of the JAGM-MR.

Lockheed invested in the upgrades with no external investment, but would not say how much funding it put toward the effort.

While the Army and the Marine Corps are the first adopters of the capability, the United Kingdom also signed on to receive JAGM, committing to the new missile in 2021.

As the company has worked on the effort, beginning static motor firings in November 2021, it saw an increased level of interest from foreign customers, Drake said. Lockheed plans to continue proving out the technology both on the tri-mode seeker and range fronts over 2023.

The company acknowledged in a statement that “previous discussions of a medium range missile variant of JAGM were met with cost-prohibitive concerns, whether it was concerns because of the camera technology needed for the seeker or concerns about the additional hardware needed to integrate the third mode into the system,”

But now Lockheed believes it can provide this additional capability at a cost that is “very close” to current JAGM production.

Lockheed noted in its statement that the Army is now looking to address its aviation strategy with a JAGM Increment 3 requirement, which would increase the range of the missile and add the tri-mode seeker.

The company stated it is now working with the Army to “develop the JAGM roadmap to go from development to production as quickly as possible. The next steps will be to work with the Army to secure funding for this product improvement program.”

Sweden, Finland try ‘future ally’ path with Turkey in bid to join NATO

HELSINKI — Finland and Sweden have adopted a common “future ally” approach with Turkey in an attempt to fast-track their NATO membership — something hindered by the Ankara government.

Turkey has refused to ratify Finland’s and Sweden’s membership applications until preconditions are met. Furthermore, Ankara has accused the two unaligned Nordic states of hostility toward the country’s record on human rights, and for refusing to license defense companies in the two applicant countries the ability to export weapons to Turkey.

Twenty-eight of the alliance’s 30 member states have already ratified the NATO membership applications submitted by Sweden and Finland. Hungary is expected to formalize its ratification in the first quarter of 2023.

Government officials in Helsinki and Stockholm claim the ongoing, intensified membership discussions and political bridge-building have helped create a greater level of trust to significantly improve relations with Ankara.

In particular, both Finland and Sweden have managed to advance talks with Turkey by agreeing to revise their restrictive approach to arms sales by domestic defense companies. The Turkish government has identified arm sales reform as a precondition for its support for Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO applications.

Neither Finland nor Sweden imposed a formal ban on arms exports to Turkey. However, the two Nordic states have a policy of not issuing new export permits for weapons sales to the country, a position that was influenced by ground attacks launched by Turkey against Syrian Kurds from 2016 to 2019.

“Little by little we need to reach a position where we can consider Turkey as a future ally. We need to take into account, as part of the overall consideration relating to arms exports to Turkey and the issuing of export permits, how best to develop a new mindset to achieve improved relations with Ankara,” said Finnish Defence Minister Antti Kaikkonen.

Sweden’s Defence Ministry is adopting a stance similar to Finland. Stockholm also enforces a technical ban on the export of defense equipment to Turkey, but the ministry is examining what changes in policy are required, including legislative action, to allow Sweden’s defense groups to obtain export licenses to deliver weapons to Turkey.

Finland and Sweden are pursuing what officials have described as an organic solution to the arms export issue. This would involve permitting Finnish and Swedish defense companies to compete for Turkish military contracts, and for the governments to process defense materiel export applications under criteria reserved for so-called premier tier export countries.

Meanwhile, Turkey has used the membership ratification process as an opportunity to pursue concessions from other NATO member states. For example, Turkey wants the U.S. government to approve the modernization of its F-16 fighter fleet and for alliance members to lift de facto arms embargos against Ankara.

“Negotiations with Ankara are complicated for various reasons, but importantly we are moving together in the right direction,” said Tobias Billström, Sweden’s foreign affairs minister. “We are confident a positive outcome will happen, and that the continuing talks will ultimately lead to the full ratification of Sweden’s membership of NATO in 2023.”

Finnish President Sauli Niinistö told reporters on Dec. 11 that Finland’s and Sweden’s membership of NATO would take time.

“Hungary has told us it will not be the last one to ratify. In Turkey, the solution lies with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The timing of ratification is unfortunately intertwined with internal politics in Turkey,” Niinistö said.

A series of high-level, bilateral talks have been in motion between the Turkish government and representatives from the Finnish and Swedish governments since the beginning of winter.

Kaikkonen visited Ankara in early December. Despite advances and a visible “warming in relations,” the Finnish defense minister said he could not confidently predict when Turkey might ratify Finland’s NATO application.

Turkey’s delay is also influenced by internal politics and parliamentary elections due to be held there in June 2023. NATO expansion is expected to emerge as a major issue in the elections, a development that could postpone a decision on ratification until the third or fourth quarter of 2023.

There are also differences on regional security issues that remain unresolved. In particular, before the NATO applications process kicked off, Sweden and Finland had questioned Turkey’s plan to establish an 18.6-mile-wide security zone in northern Syria.

In soliciting Turkey’s support for NATO membership, Sweden and Finland have also found themselves defending their positions and policies toward the Kurdish PYD Democratic Union Party and its armed militia, the Syrian Kurdish YPG.

The PYD has links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which the U.S. and the European Union, including Finland and Sweden, consider a terrorist organization. Turkey has accused Sweden and Finland of harboring “PKK terrorists” and failing to cooperate with Ankara on extradition warrants.

Army special operations rethinking force structure, tech

The next year could prove pivotal for the Army’s most elite forces, as ongoing experiments with force structure and how to best integrate technical expertise at the tactical level could reshape the way the service’s special operations look and fight.

Army Times obtained an exclusive interview with the commanding general of Army Special Operations Command at the Association of the U.S. Army conference in October, highlighting the pilot programs for the publication’s November cover story.

Lt. Gen. Jon Braga explained that the increasing role that space and cyber operations play in competition and conflicts (such as the ongoing war in Ukraine) has necessitated a reconsideration of long-held truths. The recently-unveiled “influence triad” is a framework to help commanders consider special operations, space and cyber together in a modern-era “combined arms” model.

The command is experimenting with expanding the size of the Special Forces operational detachment-alpha from the traditional 12 soldiers to 16. Other “convergence” efforts are underway to integrate all three branches of Army SOF at the battalion and brigade headquarters levels rather than keeping them siloed by branch as they currently are.

Braga also said that the command is experimenting with creating a new career field with a tech focus to help take some of the technical load off of the soldiers currently on the teams.

The commander indicated that other options could be on the table as well, such as restructuring the reserve component civil affairs and psychological operations formations.

Lockheed challenges US Army’s helicopter award

WASHINGTON — Lockheed Martin plans to protest the U.S. Army’s contract award to Textron’s Bell to build the Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft, expected to be the service’s largest helicopter procurement in 40 years.

Lockheed Martin’s Sikorsky, as the prime contractor on a team with Boeing, said Wednesday it was filing a protest that day with the Government Accountability Office.

The FLRAA competition pitted two aircraft head to head: Bell’s V-280 Valor, a tiltrotor aircraft, and Sikorsky and Boeing’s Defiant X, which features coaxial rotor blades. Both aircraft were designed to fit into the same footprint as a Black Hawk.

Paul Lemmo, Sikorsky’s president, said in a statement that the team conducted “a thorough review of the information and feedback provided by the Army.”

“The data and discussions lead us to believe the proposals were not consistently evaluated to deliver the best value in the interest of the Army, our soldiers and American taxpayers,” he said.

The deal for the next-generation helicopter is worth up to $1.3 billion and is set to replace about 2,000 Black Hawk utility helicopters. FLRAA will not serve as a 1-to-1 replacement for existing aircraft, but it will take over the roles of the Black Hawk — long the workhorse of the Army for getting troops to and around the battlefield — around 2030.

The engineering and manufacturing development as well as the low-rate production phase could be worth roughly $7 billion. If the full complement of aircraft are purchased across the entire life of the fleet, the program could be worth around $70 billion to include potential foreign military sales, the Army’s program executive officer for aviation, Maj. Gen. Rob Barrie, said during a Dec. 5 media roundtable following the Army’s selection of Bell.

Army officials said the service sought to ensure the FLRAA program decision would be unassailable. Yet, Army acquisition chief Doug Bush said during the Dec. 5 briefing that the service “anticipated [a protest] potentially happening and [has] accounted for that in our timelines.”

Defense News has reached out to the Army, the GAO and Bell for comment.

New rifle, light machine gun headed to close combat troops

The Army plans to field in 2023 a rifle and light machine combination that will replace the standard issue M4 carbine and the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon for its close combat force.

They’re not alone, both the Marine Corps and Special Operations Command have been included in the years-long testing and experimentation phase and will have the option to adopt the new-caliber weapons.

That new caliber, a special, Army-designed 6.8mm round, is the biggest change that shooters will see. The Next Generation Squad Weapon program had industry competitors build the weapon around the round.

This past year, Sig Sauer won the $4.7 billion weapon contract and Vortex Optics and Sheltered Wings working together won the $2.7 billion NGSW-Fire Control.

Once fielded, the M5 carbine replacement and the M250 SAW replacement, will allow users to shoot farther, faster with more accurate shots that are more lethal than the current 5.56mm round used in the two legacy weapons.

The fielding will go to operational units, likely in early 2023. Those units have not yet been identified publicly by Army officials. The full rollout to the entire close combat force will happen over several years.

That close combat force includes infantry, scouts and combat engineers who support or deploy alongside infantry and scouts.

The rest of the force will continue to carry the M4 and M249 for the coming decade or longer.

Both weapons feature M-lock handguards, a Picatinny Rail for attaching shooting accessories, an ambidextrous safety and left-side accessible charging handle for the M250.

The two will also feature the NGSW-Fire Control, which is a computer-assisted optic that can provide aim correction, first focal plane optic, a disturbed reticle, ballistics computer and laser range finder. It also links wirelessly with current and future soldier electronics.

Israel’s incoming government taps former general as defense minister

JERUSALEM — Israel’s incoming government has selected former Maj. Gen. Yoav Gallant as the new defense minister.

Gallant played a key role in Israeli operations in the 1990s and early 2000s. He will replace Benny Gantz, who served as defense minister since 2020.

Gallant will inherit a military force that is in the midst of incorporating the Momentum plan in a bid to become a more digital-centric and technologically advanced force. He will also enter office amid tension with Iran and a stalled peace process with Palestine.

Gantz often traveled abroad as defense minister, including to the United States, Turkey, Morocco, Bahrain and Azerbaijan. His frequent trips came in the wake of the Abraham Accords, an agreement meant to normalize relations between Israel and its regional neighbors Bahrain, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates.

Israel has since secured new defense deals in Morocco and the UAE, and it plays a greater role with U.S. Naval Forces Central Command now that Israel falls into U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility.

In addition to this geopolitical state, Gallant will likely oversea delivery of new KC-46A refueling tankers and new CH-53 helicopters.

Gallant was born in 1958 in Jaffa, Israel, and currently lives in Amikam. He has a bachelor of arts in economics and business administration from the University of Haifa, and he studied management at Harvard University. He serves in the legislative body Knesset with the Likud party, and he chairs the foreign affairs and defense committees.

Gallant served in the Israel Defense Forces for 35 years, during which he commanded a missile boat and the elite Shayetet 13 unit. He moved from his position as a Navy commando to serve in the Ground Forces, later becoming head of the Gaza division.

In 2002, he was appointed military secretary of then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. He was in a key position to witness Israel’s major decisions during the Second Intifada. He then led the IDF’s Southern Command from 2005 to 2010, during the era after Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip and had to contend with Hamas rocket fire.

He managed Operation Warm Winter in early 2008. Tension along the Gaza border eventually led to Operation Cast Lead in 2009, in which Gallant played a key role. He was briefly tapped to be IDF chief of staff in 2010, but his appointment was withdrawn amid controversy over property claims. He was later cleared of wrongdoing.

Gallant was elected to the Knesset in 2015. After serving as the minister of construction, he became the minister of immigration and absorption as well as the minister of education. In 2018, when Gallant was a member of the Kulanu party and the minister of construction, he described the Oslo peace process as problematic.

“Israel gave and gave and didn’t get anything back,” he said in an interview with the Jerusalem Post. At the time, he did not rule out a Palestinian state but said it should not have military control of its airspace. He also praised Israel’s new security technology, such as the Iron Dome and its cyber tools.

He switched parties in 2018 and served as the minister of immigration under Netanyahu’s government in 2019. As a minister, he also was part of the Security Cabinet, which makes key security decisions.

Lithuania’s defense minister is leery Russia will run out of ammo

WASHINGTON ― The defense minister of Baltic ally Lithuania voiced skepticism over the recent Pentagon assessment that Russia, after months of fighting Ukraine and slapped with western sanctions, would deplete its fully-serviceable ammunition stockpiles by early 2023.

Arvydas Anušauskas, following visits with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and other U.S. officials here, said in an interview that any appraisals of Russia’s weapons stockpiles ought to also factor in Lithuania’s Russian-allied neighbor Belarus, which sent Russia more than 20,000 tons of ammunition earlier this year.

Anušauskas also discussed Lithuania’s deal to buy the Lockheed Martin-made M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, reports the U.S. plans to send the Patriot missile defense system to Ukraine, and recent plans to increase the defense ministry’s budget.

This interview, from Dec. 16, was edited for length and clarity.

The big news from your visit to Washington is the the HIMARS deal finalized this week. How does that connect to Latvia and Estonia also buying HIMARS?

A year ago, we agreed with Latvia and Estonia about our joint capability development. The Estonians have already concluded their agreement [to buy HIMARS] a month ago, Lithuania is completing and signing it now, and the Latvians just formed a new government but will probably finalize this deal soon.

To summarize, HIMARS allows us to develop new division-level capabilities and will help us to create a division-level, command-and-control element.

It’s an enabler for us regionally. Current and future regional plans actually link all of our countries into one entity, into one unit. With Latvia and Estonia, our HIMARS will be integrated into NATO defense plans and be interoperable with other elements.

What’s the timing for deliveries?

Delivery for Lithuania will start in 2025 and will be complete in 2026, and for Estonia, deliveries start in 2024 and finish in 2025.

European defense leaders are worried about balancing Ukraine aid, their own readiness and industry’s ability to backfill. What’s Lithuania’s experience, and where is the biggest pinch?

Capability restoration is the major rule we follow when we provide support to Ukraine. If we transfer certain equipment or weapons, we have to have an agreement to replenish our stocks. For example, if we agree to transfer 120mm mortars, we have an agreement with Spain on acquiring more of them. Practically all the support we have sent we have already restored or will restore in the near future.

Of course, the industrial capacities in Europe [alone], because we have some weaponry purchased in Europe, are not sufficient.

Lithuania finalized its HIMARS deal weeks after Estonia, and its deliveries will come a year after Estonia’s. Is that a sign of stretched industrial capacity?

As far as I know, the industry has doubled its pace in producing HIMARS, including launchers and ammunition. But in terms of orders, Poland also ordered them so the waiting list is rather long.

Lithuania is sandwiched between Kaliningrad and Belarus. Do you feel the threat has degraded at all?

I would say that their threat-level remains unchanged; capability is diminished on Kaliningrad but the overall threat level has not changed.

Diminished but unchanged, how?

Some part of the capabilities were deployed to Ukraine from Kaliningrad. The Ukrainians destroyed them, as we know. But the recent mobilization in Russia allowed it restore its human resources. And we have to bear in mind that only land forces were used for fighting in Ukraine, so the aviation capabilities, the navy, Iskanders, remained in Kaliningrad.

The U.S. government just assessed that Russia will run out of serviceable ammunition in 2023. Do you agree?

The people in the hotspots, at the frontline, cannot confirm this information. And as far as we know, Russia has sufficient artillery capabilities and ammunition. We’re not sure about stocks, but some experts calculate that by spring next year, it may run out of it. We are not sure about their industrial capacity, which would allow for replenishing their stocks, and that’s the question.

You think they have the ability to replenish their stocks?

They have the possibility to restore some of their stocks.

Is there some particular information that makes you think that and is there a specific kind of ammunition that they might be able to restore?

No, I do not have such detailed information about as we are well aware, Russia is using the ammunition in line with the old standards: 152mm and 122mm ammunition, so it may be able to restore it or it may be receiving it from North Korea.

We should also count ammunition from Belarus, from which Russia has taken more than 20,000 tons of ammunition. We don’t know how large stocks are in Belarus, but by transferring its armored equipment and ammunition to Russia, Belarus remains a major resource.

The U.S. is expected to send Patriot air defenses to Ukraine, which Russia may see as an escalation. Is that a weapon that the U.S. should not send, and are there new weapons that the U.S. should be sending?

The major challenge in this issue is training of personnel using this equipment, and Lithuania along with other European countries do not care, so to speak‚ about the position of Russia. There is a great need to protect Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure by all means, and I believe that the transfer of this capability should be treated as a deescalation measure that does not allow Russia to escalate.

In February, when we transferred Stingers to Ukraine, the talk was that this transfer would escalate the situation and we had a different position. Our position was that the stronger Ukraine would have been, the fewer possibilities Russia would have had to implement its aggressive policy. If more countries supported Ukraine at that point in time, this was done then by only several countries, we probably wouldn’t have had a war.

What decisions do you think need to be pushed forward?

Looking back at support Ukraine from March until now, the process probably was not as fast as we would have liked, but it is going on and now we’re start speaking about the transfer of air defense systems and Western-type armored equipment. Even now Lithuania is now transferring to Ukraine sniper equipment, night vision equipment, optics, to contribute to creating an advantage for the Ukrainians on the battlefield at night.

The U.S. earlier this month announced that it would change the status of its forces in in Lithuania to a persistent rotational presence. What is what does that mean and how does it relate to NATO plans to increase its presence on its eastern edge?

NATO’s Madrid summit took this decision, but this is an additional step made in the Baltic region. Along with other Baltic States, Lithuania has actively aimed for persistent rotations of U.S. troops. And along with the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence forces, it’s an additional capability which is very important in my opinion.

And are there any capability gaps that you see that allies still need to plug?

Our priorities are strong air defense and anti-missile defense, prepositioning of weapons and ammunition, the greater presence of NATO allies in Lithuania, and we work actively on this with our European partners, especially in Germany.

In the area of military capability development, there is still a lot of work to be done and we see no end. If we want to reach a presence of our allies in Lithuania, we need to do our homework as well, we have to build infrastructure, and we started establishing a new training range we have to complete. All of our allies are saying the same thing, that these forces cannot just be present in Lithuania, the forces have to train here.

Has Lithuania has been seeking the creation of rotational air defenses, and how does that relate to its push to expanding Baltic air policing?

Indeed Lithuania is aiming for this and in the near future we will circulate a white paper to our allies because we need more clarity on how to implement. They’re tied together, it’s the transition from air policing to air defense. I wouldn’t be able to explain that now because we ourselves are not very clear about it yet.

Beyond HIMARS, what investments is Lithuania planning after the decision earlier this year to expand defense spending?

Indeed, we increased defense spending on acquisitions. Next year we are completing the acquisition of Boxer infantry fighting vehicles with Spike missiles, and we will enter the next stage of the acquisitions to procure more of them.

Some time ago, we procured from Germany self-propelled howitzers, but because production stopped in Germany, we are in a week’s time going to finalize a contract with France for the Caesar self-propelled howitzer.

We are also implementing projects related to electronic and digital security, counter-UAV capabilities and we will conclude another contract in several days to purchase the Switchblade 600.

We aim at having modern troops, and we want to supply our troops not only with fragmentation vests or helmets but also with weapons equipped with optics, thermal-vision and night vision.

How does Lithuania regard a new entrant into the defense market like South Korea, which also makes self-propelled howitzers, and is known for marketing itself pretty aggressively?

Yes, we were looking into this possibility, and what concerns us and what we learned from Ukraine is that the logistical supply chain should be as short as possible. Maybe when Poland opens a factory for these Korean howitzers, we might consider this possibility, but now we do not have these plans and we’re focused more on European manufacturers. We established contacts with South Korea because it has equipment which might which might [eventually] be purchased.

Some European officials recently have talked about the importance of reinvigorating the continent’s defense industry and we also hear about coordination between between EU partners. How is that playing out?

At the ministerial level we discuss this very often because money is available, but industry has not responded clearly to the opportunity that has opened up for it. I have heard that industry is saying that that these orders would be short term and what they need to see is a 10-year perspective.

Is that a reasonable request, and will we see 10 years of orders?

Yes, I believe that it’s quite feasible to meet this requirement because some companies already have orders for a decade. That applies to HIMARS and Javelins. And Germany also promised to restore its industrial capacity to produce Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzers, and they would have long-term orders. The famous Bayraktar, a tactical drone used in Ukraine, has orders for five years.

Poland buys two spy satellites from Airbus

WARSAW, Poland — Poland’s Defence Ministry has signed a deal to acquire two observation satellites from French company Airbus.

The deal is part of Poland’s efforts to boost its military reconnaissance capacities following Russia’s invasion of its neighbor Ukraine.

Polish Defence Minister Mariusz Błaszczak and French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu signed the contract Dec. 27 in Warsaw.

A spokesperson for the Polish ministry told Defense News that the net value of the deal is about €575 million (U.S. $612 million).

“The Polish satellites will be launched into space until 2027,” the spokesperson said. “Already in 2023, the Polish Armed Forces will gain access to the resources of the existing Pléiades Neo [Earth observation] satellite constellation.”

The two satellites will be delivered to Warsaw along with a receiving station.

“The satellites will increase the capabilities of the Polish military in the field of acquiring reconnaissance data based on observation satellites operating as part of the French-Polish constellation,” the ministry said in a statement. “Owing to them, it will be possible [for Poland] to obtain reconnaissance data in the field of image reconnaissance with an accuracy of up to 30 cm, and operations within the constellation will allow for imaging a significantly larger area of the Earth than it is possible for a single country.”

Błaszczak said other issues he discussed with his French counterpart included areas of defense cooperation that could benefit Ukraine’s fight against Russia. Lecornu is scheduled to pay an official visit to Kyiv and meet with Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov on Dec. 28.

Military’s ‘special pay’ keeps cyber experts from jumping ship

WASHINGTON — The U.S. military is paying tens of millions of dollars each year above set compensation rates to keep sought-after cyber experts onboard and engaged on the digital front lines, according to a federal watchdog.

The services “spent at least $160 million on cyber retention bonuses annually” from fiscal 2017 to 2021, the Government Accountability Office said in a workforce evaluation published this month. Staffing levels across most related career fields that the auditor studied, including in the Army, Air Force and Navy, remained above 80% in the same timeframe.

Special pay is meant to help ensure the military holds on to its top performers, has people in hard-to-fill roles and maintains much-needed expertise amid rivaling opportunities with outside companies or other federal agencies. The services determine how to distribute the incentives, with guidance flowing from the Department of Defense.

The department’s ability to sustain a ready and sufficient cyber cohort is critical to the shielding of its networks and its most sensitive information as well as the execution of digital strikes or influence campaigns on foreign countries or militant groups. Recruitment woes, however, have consumed headlines; the U.S. Army, for example, suffered a shortfall of 15,000 recruits in fiscal 2022. That left the service 20,000 or so troops short of its end-strength number authorized by Congress.

‘Secure, survive, strike’: The Navy’s new approach for cyber dominance

“To accomplish its national security mission and defend a wide range of critical infrastructure, DoD must recruit, train, and retain a knowledgeable and skilled cyber workforce,” reads the report. “However, DoD faces increasing competition from the private sector looking to recruit top cyber talent to protect systems and data from a barrage of foreign attacks.”

Competition with the private sector — and even within government — for young, highly skilled talent in emerging tech fields is fierce. Big Tech offers nearly uncapped salaries, competitive benefits and workplace flexibility, though recent layoffs are creating a labor pool the government hopes to tap.

To lure in the talent it needs, and keep the staff it has, federal workplaces have looked to incentives, monetary and otherwise. In years with staffing gaps, the military services rolled out bonuses and other perks to recruit and retain.

The civilian side of government has taken a similar approach. The White House’s Office of Personnel Management just concluded its annual review of special rate requests for salary adjustments for specific occupations, grades or locations “to alleviate existing or likely significant recruitment or retention difficulties.” Other agencies have deviated from the General Schedule to create job-specific pay systems and invoke special hiring authorities.

Army Cyber Command officials told the GAO that money spent on retention bonuses is offset by the costs of recruitment and training to replace cyber personnel. The replacement cost for a service member in the 17C career field, or cyber operations specialist, who is certified to fill the interactive on-net operator role is about $400,000, while the retention bonus offered to a person with that training is $92,000 spread over six years, the report notes.

Can the Army fill its ranks?

Digital fluency is increasingly important, defense and intelligence officials say, as the U.S. ratchets up competition with China and Russia, top national security threats, according to the National Defense Strategy. Both wield significant cyber weaponry: Chinese-sponsored cyberattacks have breached a Navy contractor’s computers, jeopardizing information related to secret work on an anti-ship missile, and virtual Russian belligerence targeted U.S. elections and lubricated its war machine in Ukraine.

As a result, cyber cliques in the U.S. military are expected to expand in coming years. The Army, specifically, plans to double the size of its active-duty cyber forces by the end of the decade.

“You will continue to see the growth of our cyber branch, as we proliferate cyber-electromagnetic activities, capabilities,” Lt. Gen. John Morrison, deputy chief of staff, G-6, told reporters in June. “Think cyber and electronic warfare, integrated together, throughout all of our tactical formations.”

The Army requested $16.6 billion in cyber and information technology funding for fiscal 2023. Congressional leaders last week unveiled a $1.7 trillion government spending package, which included $858 billion for defense.

Davis Winkie with Army Times contributed to this article.

Lithuania’s defense minister is leery Russia will run out of ammo

WASHINGTON ― The defense minister of Baltic ally Lithuania voiced skepticism over the recent Pentagon assessment that Russia, after months of fighting Ukraine and slapped with western sanctions, would deplete its fully-serviceable ammunition stockpiles by early 2023.

Arvydas Anušauskas, following visits with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and other U.S. officials here, said in an interview that any appraisals of Russia’s weapons stockpiles ought to also factor in Lithuania’s Russian-allied neighbor Belarus, which sent Russia more than 20,000 tons of ammunition earlier this year.

Anušauskas also discussed Lithuania’s deal to buy the Lockheed Martin-made M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, reports the U.S. plans to send the Patriot missile defense system to Ukraine, and recent plans to increase the defense ministry’s budget.

This interview, from Dec. 16, was edited for length and clarity.

The big news from your visit to Washington is the the HIMARS deal finalized this week. How does that connect to Latvia and Estonia also buying HIMARS?

A year ago, we agreed with Latvia and Estonia about our joint capability development. The Estonians have already concluded their agreement [to buy HIMARS] a month ago, Lithuania is completing and signing it now, and the Latvians just formed a new government but will probably finalize this deal soon.

To summarize, HIMARS allows us to develop new division-level capabilities and will help us to create a division-level, command-and-control element.

It’s an enabler for us regionally. Current and future regional plans actually link all of our countries into one entity, into one unit. With Latvia and Estonia, our HIMARS will be integrated into NATO defense plans and be interoperable with other elements.

What’s the timing for deliveries?

Delivery for Lithuania will start in 2025 and will be complete in 2026, and for Estonia, deliveries start in 2024 and finish in 2025.

European defense leaders are worried about balancing Ukraine aid, their own readiness and industry’s ability to backfill. What’s Lithuania’s experience, and where is the biggest pinch?

Capability restoration is the major rule we follow when we provide support to Ukraine. If we transfer certain equipment or weapons, we have to have an agreement to replenish our stocks. For example, if we agree to transfer 120mm mortars, we have an agreement with Spain on acquiring more of them. Practically all the support we have sent we have already restored or will restore in the near future.

Of course, the industrial capacities in Europe [alone], because we have some weaponry purchased in Europe, are not sufficient.

Lithuania finalized its HIMARS deal weeks after Estonia, and its deliveries will come a year after Estonia’s. Is that a sign of stretched industrial capacity?

As far as I know, the industry has doubled its pace in producing HIMARS, including launchers and ammunition. But in terms of orders, Poland also ordered them so the waiting list is rather long.

Lithuania is sandwiched between Kaliningrad and Belarus. Do you feel the threat has degraded at all?

I would say that their threat-level remains unchanged; capability is diminished on Kaliningrad but the overall threat level has not changed.

Diminished but unchanged, how?

Some part of the capabilities were deployed to Ukraine from Kaliningrad. The Ukrainians destroyed them, as we know. But the recent mobilization in Russia allowed it restore its human resources. And we have to bear in mind that only land forces were used for fighting in Ukraine, so the aviation capabilities, the navy, Iskanders, remained in Kaliningrad.

The U.S. government just assessed that Russia will run out of serviceable ammunition in 2023. Do you agree?

The people in the hotspots, at the frontline, cannot confirm this information. And as far as we know, Russia has sufficient artillery capabilities and ammunition. We’re not sure about stocks, but some experts calculate that by spring next year, it may run out of it. We are not sure about their industrial capacity, which would allow for replenishing their stocks, and that’s the question.

You think they have the ability to replenish their stocks?

They have the possibility to restore some of their stocks.

Is there some particular information that makes you think that and is there a specific kind of ammunition that they might be able to restore?

No, I do not have such detailed information about as we are well aware, Russia is using the ammunition in line with the old standards: 152mm and 122mm ammunition, so it may be able to restore it or it may be receiving it from North Korea.

We should also count ammunition from Belarus, from which Russia has taken more than 20,000 tons of ammunition. We don’t know how large stocks are in Belarus, but by transferring its armored equipment and ammunition to Russia, Belarus remains a major resource.

The U.S. is expected to send Patriot air defenses to Ukraine, which Russia may see as an escalation. Is that a weapon that the U.S. should not send, and are there new weapons that the U.S. should be sending?

The major challenge in this issue is training of personnel using this equipment, and Lithuania along with other European countries do not care, so to speak‚ about the position of Russia. There is a great need to protect Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure by all means, and I believe that the transfer of this capability should be treated as a deescalation measure that does not allow Russia to escalate.

In February, when we transferred Stingers to Ukraine, the talk was that this transfer would escalate the situation and we had a different position. Our position was that the stronger Ukraine would have been, the fewer possibilities Russia would have had to implement its aggressive policy. If more countries supported Ukraine at that point in time, this was done then by only several countries, we probably wouldn’t have had a war.

What decisions do you think need to be pushed forward?

Looking back at support Ukraine from March until now, the process probably was not as fast as we would have liked, but it is going on and now we’re start speaking about the transfer of air defense systems and Western-type armored equipment. Even now Lithuania is now transferring to Ukraine sniper equipment, night vision equipment, optics, to contribute to creating an advantage for the Ukrainians on the battlefield at night.

The U.S. earlier this month announced that it would change the status of its forces in in Lithuania to a persistent rotational presence. What is what does that mean and how does it relate to NATO plans to increase its presence on its eastern edge?

NATO’s Madrid summit took this decision, but this is an additional step made in the Baltic region. Along with other Baltic States, Lithuania has actively aimed for persistent rotations of U.S. troops. And along with the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence forces, it’s an additional capability which is very important in my opinion.

And are there any capability gaps that you see that allies still need to plug?

Our priorities are strong air defense and anti-missile defense, prepositioning of weapons and ammunition, the greater presence of NATO allies in Lithuania, and we work actively on this with our European partners, especially in Germany.

In the area of military capability development, there is still a lot of work to be done and we see no end. If we want to reach a presence of our allies in Lithuania, we need to do our homework as well, we have to build infrastructure, and we started establishing a new training range we have to complete. All of our allies are saying the same thing, that these forces cannot just be present in Lithuania, the forces have to train here.

Has Lithuania has been seeking the creation of rotational air defenses, and how does that relate to its push to expanding Baltic air policing?

Indeed Lithuania is aiming for this and in the near future we will circulate a white paper to our allies because we need more clarity on how to implement. They’re tied together, it’s the transition from air policing to air defense. I wouldn’t be able to explain that now because we ourselves are not very clear about it yet.

Beyond HIMARS, what investments is Lithuania planning after the decision earlier this year to expand defense spending?

Indeed, we increased defense spending on acquisitions. Next year we are completing the acquisition of Boxer infantry fighting vehicles with Spike missiles, and we will enter the next stage of the acquisitions to procure more of them.

Some time ago, we procured from Germany self-propelled howitzers, but because production stopped in Germany, we are in a week’s time going to finalize a contract with France for the Caesar self-propelled howitzer.

We are also implementing projects related to electronic and digital security, counter-UAV capabilities and we will conclude another contract in several days to purchase the Switchblade 600.

We aim at having modern troops, and we want to supply our troops not only with fragmentation vests or helmets but also with weapons equipped with optics, thermal-vision and night vision.

How does Lithuania regard a new entrant into the defense market like South Korea, which also makes self-propelled howitzers, and is known for marketing itself pretty aggressively?

Yes, we were looking into this possibility, and what concerns us and what we learned from Ukraine is that the logistical supply chain should be as short as possible. Maybe when Poland opens a factory for these Korean howitzers, we might consider this possibility, but now we do not have these plans and we’re focused more on European manufacturers. We established contacts with South Korea because it has equipment which might which might [eventually] be purchased.

Some European officials recently have talked about the importance of reinvigorating the continent’s defense industry and we also hear about coordination between between EU partners. How is that playing out?

At the ministerial level we discuss this very often because money is available, but industry has not responded clearly to the opportunity that has opened up for it. I have heard that industry is saying that that these orders would be short term and what they need to see is a 10-year perspective.

Is that a reasonable request, and will we see 10 years of orders?

Yes, I believe that it’s quite feasible to meet this requirement because some companies already have orders for a decade. That applies to HIMARS and Javelins. And Germany also promised to restore its industrial capacity to produce Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzers, and they would have long-term orders. The famous Bayraktar, a tactical drone used in Ukraine, has orders for five years.